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THE HISTORY OF SLAVE MARRIAGE IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
DARLENE C. GORING• 
The slave has n o  rights. Of course, he or she cannot have the rights 
of a husband, a wife. The slave is a chattel, and chattels do not 
marry. 'The slave is not ranked among sentient beings, but among 
things;' and things are not married. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The American paradigm of legally permissible marital 
relationships was shaped by the African-American slave 
experience. Colonial and antebellum legislation and jurisprudence 
prohibited marriages between bonded slaves. The end of the Civil 
War and the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment2 brought 
postbellum recognition of marriages between emancipated African 
slaves, and the Supreme Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia in 
1967 recognized an even more expansive definition of the marital 
paradigm that included legal protection of marriages between 
mixed raced couples.3 The boundary of this paradigm is currently 
being tested in federal and state courts and legislatures, as well 
the court of public opinion, as groups of gay and lesbian couples 
seek the legal recognition and protections associated with 
legislative and judicial sanction of their relationships.4 The 
· Associate Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana 
State University, B.B.A., Howard University; J.D. and L.L.M., Northwestern 
University School of Law. I would like to thank my colleagues Michael 
Malinowski and Joseph Bockrath for their comments and assistance. I 
dedicate this article to my son, Richard M. Ross, III. 
1. WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE: ITS DISTINCTIVE FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES, JUDICIAL 
DECISIONS, & ILLUSTRATIVE FACTS 90 (1853). 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to 
their jurisdiction."). 
3. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
4. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & E. Gary Spitko, Navigating 
Dangerous Constitutional Straits: A Prolegomenon on the Federal Marriage 
Amendment and the Disenfranchisement of Sexual Minorities, 76 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 599, 625-38 (2005) (arguing that Congress should not pass the Federal 
299 
300 The John Marshall Law Reuii:w 139:299 
cultural and judicial scope of legally permissible marital 
relationships was raised to a dramatic level of scrutiny following 
the 2004 decision in Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health. There, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the 
Commonwealth's denial of marriage licenses to same sex couples 
violated the equal protection prin ciples of the Massachusetts 
Constitution. 5 
In an effort to rally broad-based support for legal recognition 
of same-sex unions, a growing number of same-sex marriage 
advocates have made symbolic connections between their struggle 
for equal rights and the African-American civil rights movement.6 
Gays and lesbians have used the names of Rosa Parks and Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. to rally supporters to their cause. 
Marriage Amendment); Joe Rollins, Same-Sex Unions and the Spectacles of 
Recognition, 39 LAW & Soc'V REV. 457, 467-74 !2005) (analyzing social 
perceptions of homosexuality); Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. 
L. REV. 1758, 1764-87 (2005) (discussing the legal and social history of 
marriage licenses); Phyllis G. Bossin, Same-Sex Unions: The New Civil Rights 
Struggle or an Assault on Traditional Marriage, 40 TULSA L. REV. 381, 384-92 
(2005) (discussing the history of civil unions and state and federal legislation 
affecting it); Edward Stein, Introducing Lawrence u. Texas: Some Background 
and a Glimpse of the Future, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 263, 275-81 (2004) 
(discussing the effect of this decision on gay marriage); Paula L. Ettelbrick, 
Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition, 5 J . L. & 
POL 'Y 107, 123-53 (1996) (describing the social effects of gay marriage); Evan 
Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay 
Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 
567, 581-610 (1994) (critiquing traditional attacks on gay marriage)_ 
5. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 
2003)(''We declare that barring an individual from the protections, benefits, 
and obligations of civil marriage solely because that person would marry a 
person of the same sex violates [equal protection and due process 
requirements of] the Massachusetts Constitution."). 
6. It seems only fitting, if perhaps late in the day, that Lawrence u. Texas 
should have been handed down just a year before the fiftieth anniversary of 
Brown u. Board of Education. For when the history of our times i s  w ritten, 
Lawrence may well be remembered as the Brown u. Board of gay and lesbian 
America. See e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence u. Texas: The 'Fundamental 
Right' that Dare Not Speak its Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1893, 1894-95 (2004). 
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE 
FlITURE OF GAY RIGHTS 67 (2002). In his chapter discussing the p assage of the 
Vermont Civil Union Act, Eskridge notes: 
Almost all of the speakers for the committee bill drew from t heir own 
experiences to support the civil rights framing of the issue. For 
example, Representative Gaye Syminton drew parallels that she and 
her husband had uncovered between southern resistance to the mandate 
in Brown u. Board of Education and some Vermonters' resistance to 
Baker u. State; 
Id. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM 
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 65 (2002)("1t is the most blatant 
evidence that gay and lesbian citizens must sit in the back of the l a w  bus 
paying for a first-class ticket and receiving second-class service."). ' 
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Moreover, civil rights advocates such as Coretta Scott King, Julian 
Bond, U.S. Representative John Lewis, and Al Sharpton support 
the campaign to legalize same-sex marriages. 7 Equally as vocal are 
African-American clergymen who resist comparisons between the 
civil rights and gay rights movements.8 
This Article will address the legitimacy of this comparison by 
determining whether parallels exist b etween historic efforts to 
legalize slave m arriages and the current same-sex marriage 
debate. This examination will trace the structural evolution of the 
right to marry among slaves and freed African Americans. Part II 
examines the legal status of slaves during the antebellum period. 
Legislation reinforced by federal and state jurisprudence, 
classified slaves as chattel devoid of both human and civil rights. 
This section will deconstruct the evolution of slaves from property 
to personhood and explore the confluence of human and civil rights 
associated with legal personhood, including the right to marry. 
This examination will reveal that during the antebellum and 
postbellum periods, both black and white Americans believed that 
principles of natural rights governed whether slaves and freed 
blacks had any right to marry. 9 Slaves were prohibited from 
marrying because, as long as they were in a state of bondage, they 
lacked the capacity to enter into any legally enforceable civil 
contracts. Once emancipated and granted the capacity to contract, 
the right of freed slaves to marry was undisputed. 
Part III of this Article will examine the historical, social, and 
cultural journey of African-Americans to both claim and exercise 
the right to marry. Although commonly used, the word "marriage" 
does not accurately describe the legal relationships between 
antebellum slaves. Slaves entered contubernal relationships which 
7. Erin Texeira, Gays and African-Americans Parallels on Rights Case, 
NEWSDAY, May 17, 2004, at A07; Edith C. Webster, Gay Rights Spark Civil­
rights Debate, Rockford Reg. Star, Aug. 7, 2004, at lAB; Sherri Williams, 
Comparing Gay, Civil Rights A Divisive Issue for Blacks, COLUMBUS DISPATCH 
(Ohio), July 2, 2004, at 8A; John Lewis, E ditorial, At a Crossroads on Gay 
Unions, BOSTON GLOBE, October 25, 2003, at Al5. 
8. Aurelio Rojas, Same-Sex Marriage Stand Opposed, SACRAMENTO BEE, 
April 19, 2005, at A3 ("We are offended when the homosexual community 
compares what they do to the civil rights community .... It's not a civil right 
for anyone to be married - marriage is a privilege."); Michael Paulson, Black 
Clergy Rejection Stirs Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, February 10, 2004, at Bl 
("[W]e're concerned with the epidemic rate of fatherlessness in America and in 
our community, and we don't think gay marriage helps that cause."); Brian 
DeBose, Black Caucus Resists Comparison of Gay 'Marriage' to Civil Rights, 
WASH. TIMES, March 15, 2004, at AOl ("The civil rights movement was more of 
a movement for the equal rights of all Americans: education, voting rights, 
jobs. Whereas gay rights in terms of gay marriage is a movement for a special 
group of Americans."). 
9. See PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY 1619-1877 (1993) (describing 
distinctions between the antebellum and postbellum periods). 
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were evidenced by long term romantic commitments. solemnized 
by informal ceremonies conducted by the plantation masters or 
ministers, both slave and white. Although denied governmental 
sanction or recognition, slave relationships had the indicia of 
marriages between freed blacks and whites. 
Part IV will identify the legislative and judicial models used 
by Confederate states, border states, and several Union States 
during the postbellum period to legalize and/or ratify slave 
relationships. A necessary component of this analysis focuses on 
the structural models used to legalize contubernal relationships 
during the antebellum period. Once identified, 0art V of this 
Article will examine the legislative models used to legalize slave 
marriages and determine whether parallels exist between judicial 
efforts to legalize same-sex m arriages. The Article concludes by 
finding that a valid comparison does exist between the experiences 
of freed slaves and same sex couples with respect to the role that 
state legislatures can and should play in creating and defining 
marital rights and obligations. 
II. "MARRIAGE" BETWEEN HUMAN CHATIEL 
African-Americans evolved socially and culturally from being 
legally defined as chattel and denied basic human and civil rights. 
The Declaration of Independence proclaimed that "all men are 
created equal" and that they are endowed with certain inalienable 
rights including the right to "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness."10 There was, however, an asterisk on this 
proclamation that limited this grant of rights only to white males. 
Although gay white males may have been socially and culturally 
deprived of rights and excluded from some institutions such as 
marriage, they were not wholly excluded from the Declaration of 
Independence, and deemed the property of others by default. 
African Americans fared only marginally better under the 
provisions of The United States Constitution. In Article I, § 2, 
slaves were reduced to the equivalent of only 3/5ths of a person for 
the purpose of apportioning representatives and tax obligations for 
each state.11 Article I, § 9 sanctioned the continued importation of 
10. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)("We hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain i nalienable Rights, that among these 
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."). 
11. 
Representatives and direct Truces shall be apportioned among the 
several States which may be included within this Union, according to 
their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the 
whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a 
Term of Years, and excluding Indians not truced, three fifths of all other 
Persons. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
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slaves to the United States until 1808.12 Article IV, § 2 prevented 
runaway slaves from seeking safe haven in free northern states by 
requiring the return of fugitive slaves to their masters.13 
The jurisprudence of both the state and federal governments 
reinforced the notion that slaves were chattel devoid of any civil 
rights.14 The diminished status of African slaves began in 1705 
with the promulgation of the first slave codes that defined and 
governed the lives of African slaves during the antebellum 
period.15 As chattel, slaves were considered items of personalty 
with little to distinguish them from horses, cows, or farm 
equipment.16 During the antebellum period, each slave-holding 
state of the Union regulated the condition and legal status of 
slaves through slave codes.11 These codes governed every facet of 
slave life.18 Slaves could not own, rent, or transfer real property, 
own personal property, make or enter into any civil contracts, 
12. 
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now 
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the 
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a 
Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten 
dollars for each Person. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
13. 
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, 
who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on 
Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be 
delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the 
Crime. 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. 
14. KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE 
ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 197-98 (1956). Regarding the rights of slaves, the 
author states: 
Id. 
Nor could a chattel be a party to a suit, except indirectly when a free 
person represented him in a suit for freedom. In court he was not a 
competent witness, except in a case involving another slave. He had no 
civil rights, no political rights, no claim to his time, no freedom of 
movement. 
15. An Act Concerning Servants and Slaves, Ch. 48, 3 Va. Stat. 447 (1705), 
available at 
http://www.law.du.edu /russell/lh/alh/docs /virginiaslaverystatutes.html. 
16. SLAVERY RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1700-1872 93 (Paul 
Finkleman, ed. 1988) [hereinafter SLAVERY RACE] (Reprint of Sketch of the 
Laws relating to Slavery in the several states of the United States of America, 
George M. Stroud 23 (1827))("The cardinal principle of slavery, that the slave 
is not to be ranked among sentient beings, but among things - is an article of 
property - a chattel personal, obtains as undoubted law in all the Slave 
States."). 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
304 The John Marshall Law Rl'l1iew (39:299 
lawfully be taught to read or write,·� or exert dominion over their 
physical body or surroundings.�" In additi�n, slav�s la�ked the 
ability to receive real or personal property either by mhentance or 
. t t 21 mes acy. 
The slave's lack of capacity was affirmed by the Supreme 
Court in Hall v. United States, where the Court refused to enforce 
a claim made by a former slave against the estate of his master.xi 
The Court agreed that a slave was not entitled to political or civil 
rights while subject to the condition of servitude.�· The slave's 
acquisitions belonged to his m aster, he had no ability to contract 
or be contracted with, and c ould therefore make no binding 
contract with his master.24 Prior to Lincoln's signing of the 
Emancipation Proclamation and the passage of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, slaves were human anomalies.2r. Until that point in 
19. SLAVERY RACE, supra note 16. See generally Miss. Act of June 18, 1822, 
§ 25, (noting the "penalty for teaching a slave to read, imprisonment one 
year."); Aiken's Digest of Alabama , § 31, at 347. (explaining the penalty "for 
attempting to teach any free colored person, or slave, to spell, read or write, a 
fine of not less than two hundred and fifty dollars nor more than five hundred 
dollars "); Va. Rev. Code, Vol. I, at 424 (mandating that "[a}ny slave or free 
colored person found at any school for teaching reading or writing, by day or 
night, may be whipped, at the discretion of a justice, not exceeding twenty 
lashes."). 
20. See WILBERT E. MOORE, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY AND ABOLITION: A 
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY 101 (1971). The author explains: 
Id. 
Perhaps the most outstanding application of the legal rule that a slave 
could not be a party to a contract, and certainly the one most often 
pointed out by the abolitionists, was the denial of any legal marriage, 
either between slaves, or between a slave and a freeman .... The slave 
"husband " or "wife " might be forced to testify against the other partner 
in a criminal case (otherwise long exempted in Common Law judicial 
proceedings). The union between slaves might be as permanent or 
temporary as the interests of the slaves, or especially of the masters, 
might dictate. The union was subject at any time to being broken 
through sale of one of the slaves. Moreover, the charge of adultery could 
not be made against a slave, and the male slave had no legal action 
against another, whether slave, free Negro, or White, for intercourse 
with his "wife," nor could he present such evidence in his defense on a 
criminal charge of assault and battery or murder. The slave had no 
honor to defend. In this the slave codes of the South went much further 
than the Roman civil code, where a type of marriage (contubernium, not 
connubium) was recognized. 
21. Trotter v. Blocker, 6 Port. 269, 290, (Ala. 1838). 
22. Hall v. United States, 92 U.S. 27, 24-30 (1875). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1 s t  Sess. 2949-55 (1864) (characterizing 
conditions of slavery in the remarks and debates of members of the House of 
Representatives on the abolition of slavery and the adoption of the Thirteenth 
Amendment). Mr. Thomas Bowles Shannon noted on June 14, 1864: 
Now, sir, what is this institution of slavery that has sought to assume 
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history, a literal point of entry into some recognition of African­
Americans as persons and citizens, the United States Supreme 
Court consistently supported the principle that slaves were chattel 
property. In 1856, the Supreme Court in Scott v. Sanford, declared 
not only that slaves were property but, as such, they were not 
citizens of the United States entitled to constitutional protection.26 
The Court held that slaves were "regarded as beings of an inferior 
order ... altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either 
in social or political relations, and so far inferior, that they had no 
rights which the white man was bound to respect .... "27 The Court 
struck down legislation that prohibited owning slaves in the state 
of Missouri as a violation of the due process clause.28 The Court 
expressly addressed the status of American slaves, holding that: 
[T]he right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed 
in the Constitution. The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article 
of merchandise and property, was guarantied to the citizens of the 
United States, in every State that might desire it, for twenty years. 
And the Government in express terms is pledged to protect it in all 
future time . . . .  29 
The emancipation of slaves, coupled with ratification of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, shattered the paradox that slaves were 
both human and chattel. Thereafter, upon passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, basic human rights, such as the right to 
contract, the right to own, sell, and lease real and personal 
property, were conferred on freed slaves.30 In this context, 
recognition of the slaves' right to marry was an integral part of 
their transformation into legally recognized personhood. 31 
the reins of Government in this land of freedom? What is slavery, sir? It 
is 'the sum total of villainies.' It is the destroyer of every virtue, public 
as well as private, because it encourages promiscuous and unbridled 
licentiousness, and renders null the marriage relation. 
Id. Mr. Francis William Kellogg stated: 
[Slaves) are men, but they must not read the work of God; they have no 
right to any reward for their labor; no right to their wives; no right to 
their children; no right to themselves! The law makes them property 
and affords them no protection, and what are the Christian people of 
this country doing about it? Nothing at all! 
Id. at 2955. 
26. Scott, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
27. Id. at 407. 
28. Id. at 450-52. 
29. Id. at 451-52. 
30. 1866 Civil Rights Act, Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, (1866) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1 481-1482 (2000)). 
31.  Ariela Gross, Beyond Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race 
and Slavery, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 640, 666 (200 1 ). Professor Gross states: 
The household approach to slavery also leads historians to focus on the 
institution of marriage during Reconstruction as a vehicle for political 
transformation. Several recent histories of Reconstruction have 
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One significant distinction between African-Americans and same­
sex couples that becomes apparent from this historic reflection is 
that gay and lesbian individuals in the United States do not 
shoulder a legacy of being legally de fined as chattel and not 
citizens. The status and individual rights enjoyed by each member 
of a same-sex union affords them with the potential ability, albeit 
limited, to provide their partners and their children with some 
legal protections.3� None of these legal protections were available 
to slave couples.'13 As chattel owned by their masters, slaves could 
not exercise any control over their family life."' Their relationships 
were created and dissolved at their masters' whim.":. Slaves could 
not confer legitimacy upon their children, even those born to 
emphasized African American assertions of the right to marry as a 
fundamental right of citizenship. As a black corporal in the U.S. Colored 
Troops declared to his regiment in 1866, "The Marriage Covenant is at 
the foundation of all our rights. In slavery we could not have legalised 
marriage: now we have it ... and we shall be established as a people." 
This corporal recognized that marriage was "the entering wedge into a 
broad range of social privileges," including property rights and the right 
to enter into contracts. While many newly freed people rushed to 
exercise their right to marry, they also resisted efforts by Freedman's 
Bureau officials and the authors of the Black Codes to reduce marriage 
to a system of obligations, asserting the right not to marry and to end 
one marriage and begin another . ... While marriage served the function 
of training freed people for citizenship, cultural-legal historians 
demonstrate resistance to this discipline. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
32. See generally Lornet Turnbull, Is Same-Sex Marriage a Civil-rights 
Issue?, SEATILE TIMES, April 19, 2004, at Al (quoting Pastor Reggie 
Witherspoon, Sr. , who argues that comparisons between the Civil Rights 
movement and the gay rights movement are improper, stating that "there are 
so many things that gays can do that my grandmother couldn't do .... They 
can vote, they can live where they want to live. I don't see anyone siccing dogs 
on gays like they did to African Americans i n  the 60's"). 
33. Id. 
34. STAMPP, supra note 14, at 198. 
35. See STAMPP, supra note 14, at 198 (discussing the authority of a master 
to dissolve a "marriage" between slaves). The author notes: 
Since slaves, as chattels, could not make contracts, marriages between 
them were not legally binding. "The relation between slaves is 
essentially different from that of man and wife joined in lawful 
wedlock," ruled the North Carolina Supreme Court, for "with slaves it 
may be dissolved at the pleasure of either party, or by the sale of one or 
both, depending upon the caprice or necessity of the owners." Their 
condition was compatible only with a form of concubinage, "voluntary on 
the part of the slaves, and permissive on that of the master." In law 
there was no such thing as fornicatio n  or adultery between slaves; nor 
was there bastardy, for, as a Kentucky judge noted, the father of a slave 
was "unknown" to the law. No state legislature ever seriously 
entertained the thought of encroaching upon the master's rights by 
legalizing slave marriage. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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putative slave marriages.36 Lacking contractual capacity, slaves 
could not hold title to real or personal property, nor transfer any 
such property, either by inheritance or intestacy, to their putative 
spouse or children.37 So, historically, African-Americans were in a 
very distinguishable legal-identity position from contemporary gay 
and lesbian Americans. Reading into the historic status of African­
Americans for creation of analogies and metaphors to the 
contemporary status of gay couples is forced at best. 
III. SLAVE TRADITION OF MARRIAGE 
During the period of American Slavery, blacks were denied 
even the most basic of human rights, including the right to join 
together as a legally sanctioned family unit.38 As personalty, slaves 
lacked the capacity to enter into any form of marital union 
recognized necessarily or legally by the plantation masters, the 
government, or the judiciary.39 In 1853, William Goodell wrote that 
"[t]he slave is one who is in the power of a master to whom he 
belongs. How, then, can the slave marry?''4°Slaves were, however, 
human beings although legally defined as chattel. Slave couples 
joined together in quasi-marital unions that were sanctioned by 
the plantation owners. Although viewed as marriages by members 
of the slave community, their compromised nature was without 
question.41 The old folks called it "shacking up" which is an 
incredibly appropriate description of what is more appropriately 
referred to as contubernal42 relationships. Contubernal 
36. MOORE, supra note 20, at 101.  
37. Id. 
38. Andrews v. Page, 50 Tenn. 653, 660 (1871) 
Id. 
While the institution of slavery existed, it was generally held, in the 
slaveholding States, that the marriage of slaves was utterly null and 
void; because o f  the paramount ownership in them as property, their 
incapacity to make a contract, and the incompatibility of the duties and 
obligations of husband and wife with the relation of slavery. 
39. FINKLEMAN, supra note 16, at 157-77 (Reprint of George M. Stroud, 
Sketch of the Laws relating to Slavery in the several states of the United 
States of America, 21 (1827)("Slaves . . .  were not entitled to the rights and 
considerations of matrimony, and therefore had no relief in case of adultery: 
nor were they proper objects of cognation or affinity, but of quasi-cognation 
only . . .  " ). 
40. See GOODELL, supra note 1, at 93. 
41. See generally, SLAVERY RACE, supra note 16 (quoting from the Negro 
Law of South Carolina, Chapter II, Slaves, their Civil Rights, Liabilities, and 
Disabilities, Sec. 37.) ("A slave cannot even legally contract marriage. The 
marriage of such an one is morally good, but in point of law, the union of slave 
and slave, or slave and free negro, is concubinage merely."). 
42. GOODELL, supra note 1, at 91 ("A slave cannot even contract 
matrimony; the association which takes place among slaves, and is called 
marriage, being properly designated by the word contuberium - a relation 
which has no sanctity, and to which no civil rights are attached.") . 
308 The John Marshall Law Review 
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relationships are characterized by living together in an intimate 
setting,43 sharing the "same tent,"44 or "pertaini�g to temporary 
m arriage."45 No civil rights, obligations, or protect10ns attached to 
contubernal relationships, and these relationships under slavery 
could be terminated at the will of the parties or, more 
significantly, at the will of a plantation master . .s Many 
jurisdictions prohibited clergyman from solemnizing contubernal 
relationships, and prohibited clerks from issuing marriage licenses 
and recording these putative unions.47 
In 1858, abolitionist George B. Cheever addressed this issue 
before the American Abolition Society.48 Cheever noted that the 
institution of slavery was inconsistent with traditional notions of 
the familial christianity paradigm.49 He argued that: 
The whole family relation, the whole domestic state, is prostituted, 
poisoned, turned into a misery-making machine for the agent of all 
evil. What God meant should be the source and inspiration of 
happiness, becomes the fountain of sin and woe. The sacred names 
of husband, wife, father, mother, son, daughter, babe, become the 
exponents of various forces and values in the slave-breeding 
institute.50 
Although legally unenforceable during the antebellum period, 
43. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 497 (3d ed. 1986). 
44. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 856 (2d ed. 1989). See Jones v. 
Jones, 36 Md. 447, 456 (1872). 
No leg�l marriage_ 
could be contracted by slaves under civil law, yet it 
recognized a relat10n between them, which was termed contubernium 
and, although this relation conferred no civil rights upon the parties'. 
yet, when the� bec�me free, their children being free, although born in 
Id. 
slavery, could mhent from each other and from their parents. 
45. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 856 (2d ed. 1989). 
46. SLAVE�Y RACE, supra note 16, at 61-62. The author quotes George M. 
Stroud as saymg: 
[A] slave cannot even coi:itract matrimony - the association which takes 
place among slaves, �nd is called marriage, being properly designated by 
the ��rd �ontubernmm - a relation which has no sanctity, and to which 
no �ivil rights �re attached: "A slave has never maintained an action agamst the v10lator of his bed A slave is not d 
· h d .-: 
incont · 
· h d fi 
· a mon1s e 1or 
£ b" inence, or pums e or fornication or adultery; never prosecuted 
or igamy, or petty treason for killing a husband be· I 
Id. 
more than admitted to an appeal for murder." 
mg a s ave, any 
47: See, e .g ., Laws of the State of Maryland 1777 Md L Ch Sect10n XI. 
, · aws, apter 12, 
48. George B. Cheever DD The F. 
the Sin of Slavery, Add�es� �t th 
;:e °:nd Hammer of God's Word Against 
Society (May, 1858), in JACKSON
e 
M 
nnwersary of the American Abolition 
available 
ISCELLANIES No. 84 June 1 1999 at ' , • 
jm990601.htm (last visited Nov 6 2005) 
http://www.earlyrepublic.net/ 
49. Id. 
. 
' . 
50. Id. 
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slaves who formed longstanding contubernal relationships were 
rewarded upon emancipation with legislatures in a number of 
jurisdictions legalizing their relationships as valid marriages, 
thereby legitimizing the children born of those relationships. 
Typically, slave couples did not solemnize their contubernal 
relationships with traditional wedding ceremonies performed by a 
clergyman or by a justice of the peace in a church or meeting hall. 
In many instances, slaves developed their own solemnization 
ceremonies.51 The American public, both black and white, was 
introduced to the slave wedding tradition of "jumpin' the broom" 
by Alex Haley in the novel and subsequent ground-breaking 
television mini-series Roots.52 In Roots, Haley vividly described the 
marriage ceremony of the slave couple, Bell and Kunta Kinte.53 
Prior to the wedding, the couple sought and obtained requisite 
approval of the marriage from the plantation's master.54 As was 
the custom at slave weddings, the ceremony was performed in the 
garden by the plantation's laundress.55 The formal joining of the 
slave couple was then solemnized by symbolically jumping over a 
household broomstick.56 This ritual was described by Haley: 
51. ALEX HALEY, ROOTS 325-26 (Doubleday & Co. , Inc. 1976). The 
groundbreaking television mini-series, Roots , was aired by ABC-TV in 
January 1977. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. This practice was depicted in ROOTS: 
Massa ain't want to believe me when I tol' 'im," Bell said to Kunta. "But 
he finally say h e  feel us ought to think on it for a spell yet, 'cause 
peoples gittin' married is sacred in de eyes of Jesus. To Kunta, however, 
Massa Waller said not a word about it during the next few weeks. Then 
one night Bell came running out to Kunta's cabin and reported 
breathlessly, "I done tol' 'im we still wants to marry, an he say, well, 
den, he reckon it's awright!" 
HALEY, supra note 51, at 324 (1976); See STAMPP, supra note 14, at 341 
(noting that once slaves obtained the consent of their masters, they could 
immediately begin living together or wait and have a more formal solemn 
ceremony, sometimes accompanied by a feast and gifts for the bride); Margaret 
A. Burnham, An Impossible Marriage: Slave Law and Family Law, 5 LAW AND 
lNEQ. 187 (July 1987) (explaining that the marriage ceremony was usually 
performed by the master or a black preacher, and the Christian marriage 
ceremony for the slaves was the same as for whites except for the promise of 
permanence of the union). It was also a practice for couples to set up 
housekeeping with the master's consent, but without a ceremony. Id. 
55 . See COURTNI C. WRIGHT, JUMPING THE BROOM (1994) (providing a 
fictional account of a broom jumping ceremony). "Finally, it's time for Tillie 
and Will to jump over a broom lying on the ground. Mama says that the broom 
is for sweeping away their past lives as they begin a new life together. 
Grandma Sadie says it sweeps away evil spirits, too." 
Id. 
56. PAUL FINKELMAN, WOMAN AND THE FAMILY IN A SLAVE SOCIETY 
(Garland Pub. 1989), (citing Orville W. Taylor, 'Jumping the Broomstick': Slave 
Marriage and Morality in Arkansas, ARK. HIST. Q. 17 (1958)) (noting that 
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[S]olemnly, Aunt Sukey placed a broomstick on the close�cropped 
grass just in front of Kunta and Bell, whom she now mot10ned to 
link their arms .... and then, as if from afar, he heard Aunt Sukey 
asking, "Now, ya'll two is sho' you wants to git married?" . . And 
then Aunt Sukey said, "Den, i n  de eyes of Jesus, y'all jump into de 
holy Ian' of matrimony." Kunta and Bell jumped high over the 
broomstick together, as Bell had forced him to practice over and 
over the day before. 57 
Even after emancipation, many African-American couples 
incorporated this ritual into modern wedding ceremonies as an 
affirmation of their heritage.58 The adoption of this ritual into 
modern marriage ceremonies is quite ironic in light of its true 
significance as a ritual born from desperation in the face of both 
societal and legal prohibitions. 
The putative slave marriages were almost unclear from the 
type of marital unions described by the Supreme Court in 
Griswold v. Connecticut.59 Justice Douglas noted in Griswold that 
the modern marital relationship reflected the joining o f  two people 
for the purpose of building a synergetic family unit: 
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully 
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an 
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in 
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or 
social p rojects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any 
involved i n  our prior decisions.00 
The purpose of the slave marriage was not solely aimed at 
fostering a loving relationship between two individuals. Although 
slave wedding ceremonies incorporated elements of christianity, 
the marriages were neither recognized by the government nor 
sanctioned by the church. Instead, approval of the union by the 
plantation owner was merely a license to breed, a wealth­
generating mechanism used by plantation owners to increase the 
number of slaves for their ownership and control.61 Slave codes 
�umping the broomstick' is one type of informal slave marriage ceremony, 
while others consisted of writing the names of the married slaves in the family 
bible and admonishing the couple to refrain from 'fussin' and 'fightin'). Other 
ceremonies were just as formal as those of white people. Id. 
57. HALEY, supra note 5 1, at 325 ( 1976). 
58. HARRIETTE COLE, JUMPING THE BROOM: THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
WEDDING PLANNER 10- 1 1  (1st ed. 1993). 
59. 381 U.S. 479 ( 1965). 
60. Id. at 486. 
6 1. See GoODELL, supra note 1, at 9 (noting this same doctrine has always 
been held, though differently enunciated, in the South). "Slave-mothers are 
there licensed by their masters to be 'breeders,' not wives; and thus they are 
retained as slaves." Id. See generally Pamela D. Bridgewater, Un/Re/Dis 
Covering Slave Breeding in Thirteenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 7 WASH. & 
LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANc. L.J. 1 1  (2001) (discussing the systemic r eproductive 
exploitation of slave women during the Antebellum period). 
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prevented slaves from obtaining marriage licenses, prevented 
clergy from performing marriage ceremonies for enslaved Africans, 
or protecting the sanctity of the marriage bed.62 Plantation owners 
were free to sell off either spouse or the offspring of the slave 
couple with impunity.63 It is no secret that slave owners routinely 
engaged in forced as well as consensual sexual relations with slave 
women, notwithstanding the marital status of the women.64 The 
illegitimacy of slave marriages extended beyond the boundaries of 
the plantation. 
Abolitionists drew upon the illegitimacy of slave relationships 
and their offspring to address not only the illegality but the 
immorality of slavery as an institution.65 Cheever argued that 
plantation owners who not only fostered but benefited from the 
62. GooDELL, supra note 1, at 91 ("A slave has never maintained an action 
against the violator of his bed. A slave is not admonished for incontinence, or 
punished for fornication or adultery; never prosecuted for bigamy, or petty 
treason for killing a husband being a slave, any more than admitted to an 
appeal for murder."). 
63. See generally GOODELL, supra note 1 (discussing the application of slave 
codes and their effects). 
64. See Bridgewater, supra note 61, at 91. (noting the slave owner's right to 
have sexual relations with their slaves). The author states: 
Slave owners were granted carte blanche to rape and impregnate their 
slaves. Since slave owners had unfettered sexual access to their slaves, a 
slave owner was able to be the biological father and owner of many slave 
children. This state of the law made sexual assault a wise investment 
strategy for a cash-strapped slave owner who was interested in 
increasing the number of his slaves. In order to create a viable slave 
system supported by the reproductive capacities of female slaves, it was 
necessary to deny legal protection against sexual assault to female 
slaves. 
Id. See also Stephanie L. Phillips, Claiming our Foremothers: The legend of 
Sally Hemings and the tasks of Black Feminist Theory, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S 
L. J. 401, 403 (1997) (noting the effects of relationships between slave women 
and their masters). The author states: 
Of the innumerable stories that have been told by African American 
women about sexual relationships between slave women and white men, 
only those that illustrate a paradigm of sexual oppression are usually 
treated as relevant to black feminist theory. This is problematic because 
other stories, wherein slave women have loving or ambivalent 
relationships with their masters, have present-day implications for 
black feminist theory and politics. Specifically, stories about love 
between master and slave present the question whether racial hierarchy 
can sometimes be transcended in the context of intimate relationships. 
Other stories, such as those about slave women who have ambivalent, 
perverse relationships with their masters, present the question whether 
black women form corrupt attachments to white men, to the detriment 
of'the race,' in general, and black men, in particular. 
Id. 
65. C heever, supra note 48. 
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illegitimacy of quasi-marriages betw�e� the slaves were directly 
contradicting the teachings of the Christian church: 
B our laws providing that the slave and its increase shall be 
d:emed and doomed our personal chattels forever, we constitute for 
them a millennium of sin and misery. We convert them into a 
community, in which it is impossible that the fundamental laws of 
Christianity should be recognized and obeyed, or the most commonly 
acknowledged and most sacred institutions of the Christian state be 
regarded. The laws of God for husbands, wives, fathers, mothers, 
sons daughters, children, can not be applied, can not be obeyed, in 
such
' 
a community. "Husbands, love your wives," is a divine 
injunction. But for those most miserable outcasts of humanity'. �he 
American slaves, there can be n o  such law, but an admomt10n 
against it. God's claims, so expressed, interfere with man's property 
in man. Husbands, beware of imagining that you have any rights, 
any authority, in regard to the chattels you are permitted to live 
with; beware of ever so loving them as to be unwilling to sacrifice 
them at a moment's warning to the avarice, the need, or the 
passions of your owners. Ye are not permitted to love, but only in 
subjection to the price of the market, the necessities of your master, 
and the grand rule of your domestic institution, the slave and its 
increase. 66 
An analogy can be drawn in contemporary society between 
slaves and same-sex couples regarding the creation of unique 
ceremonies to solemnize union relationships in the absence of a 
venue for legal recognition. The 'jumpin' the broom' ceremony is 
similar in nature to commitm e n t  ceremonies engaged in by same­
sex couples. Prior to the Massachusetts decision in Goodridge and 
the marriage free-for-all sparked by San Francisco's Mayor Gavin 
Newsom, commitment cerem onies were a common way for same­
sex couples to publicly recognize and celebrate their unions.67 
66. Id. 
67. Tami Min, Same-sex Couples Get Married in Droves and Hundreda Wed 
at San Francisco City Hall as Conservatives Push for Court Intervention, MIL. J. & �ENT., F�b. l�, 2004, at 14A. "About 500 people were lined up Saturday mornmg outside City Hall to secure marriage licenses 
- and then take each other as 'spouse for life' in brief vows that have given San Francisco's seat of government the feel of a Las Vegas wedding chapel." Id. Lisa Leff, Gay Coup�es Marry in San Francisco; City's Mayor, Other Officials Protest Existing Marriage Law by Grant�ng L_icenses, DAILY TEXAN, Feb. 13, 2004, at lA. "In 
an open c�allenge to Cahforma law, city authorities performed scores of same­sex _weddings ��ursday and iss�ed a stack of marriage licenses to gay and lesbian coup
_
les. Id. See Stephanie Chavez & Nicholas Riccardi, California; All They Need is Love; Gays Flock to San Francisco and Straights Descend on San�a Ana for Valentine _Wedding Licenses, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15 ,  2004, at Bl. (not�ng 
d 
the San Francisco clerk's office remained open throughout the wee �n . for �ame sex-marriages based on equal protection in the state's constitution). Between Thursday and the end of the day Saturday, more than l,OOO gay couples had conver�ed_ on Beaux Arts City Hall to get married. The court fight over whether their licenses will be legally binding documents is 
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Unlike the 'broom' ceremony, there is no symbolic icon used when 
conducting a commitment ceremony.68 Typically, the couple 
designs the ceremony to fit their own unique characteristics and 
wishes.69 The Episcopal Church in Vermont has recently created a 
unique ceremony specifically designed t o  solemnize same-sex 
• 70 umons. 
Same-sex couples lack the ability to enter into civil marriages, 
except in the state of Massachusetts,  but they do not lack the 
ability to contract because of their recognized legal status as 
individuals.11 AB a result, unlike the slave population, same-sex 
couples can obtain many protections afforded to married couples, 
such as joint bank accounts, joint tenancy home ownership, living 
wills, powers of attorney, and adoption of each other's children.72 
Although both groups mimicked traditional marriage ceremonies, 
same-sex couples have greater protections even for their putative 
relationships than slaves did. 
IV. ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO MARRY 
This Part of the Article will examine the legislative and 
judicial models used by a number of states during both the 
antebellum and postbellum periods to determine the extent to 
which those jurisdictions would confer rights upon the contubernal 
relationships formed by slaves. This examination will focus on the 
eleven states of the Confederacy, the border states of Maryland, 
scheduled to begin Tuesday." Id. 
68. See Holly Norton, The Wedding, NEWS J., May 12, 2004, at 14, 15A. 
(noting that gay and lesbian "commitment ceremonies" opening with a 
greeting by the couple or the officiant welcoming the guests and mentioning 
their relationship and commitment in general). "What's interesting here is 
that couples who perform the greeting can use this opportunity to say 
something personal and meaningful to guests at the start of the event. The 
result is a powerful and emotional opening that will set the tone for a 
ceremony." Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Kevin Eckstrom, Episcopalians Unveil Rites for Gay Unions, TIMES 
UNION, June 19, 2004, at B lO. The author notes: 
The new ceremonies include the traditional vows 'to have and to hold 
from this day forward, for better, for worse; for richer, for poorer . .  .' The 
prayers of the priest ask God to 'let their love for each other be a seal 
upon their hearts, a mantle about their shoulders, and a crown upon 
their foreheads. 
Id. 
71. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 941. 
72. See generally Jill Schachner Chanen, The Changing Face of Gay Legal 
Issues: Lawyers Advising Clients Face Uncertainties on Issues Ranging from 
Parental Rights to Estate Planning, 90 A.B.A.J. 46 (2004) (proclaiming that 
the same-sex marriage laws are so rapidly changing that the judiciary's 
response lacks uniformity); Matthew R. Dubois, Legal Planning for Gay, 
Lesbian, and Non-Traditional Elders, 63 ALB. L. REV. 263 (1999) (urging 
specialized to negate the inherent bias in the law facing homosexual couples). 
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Missouri and Kentucky, and several states that remained loyal to 
the Union including New York, Illinois, Ohio, and the District of 
Columbia. 73 
The first section of Part IV will identify and examine 
jurisdictions that conferred legal recognition upon slave 
marriages. The second section of Part IV will focus on states that 
relied upon the dormancy model, which viewed slaves as incapable 
of contracting marriage while in a state of bondage. Dormancy 
states will be further distinguished by the way in which they 
implemented this model. Some jurisdictions immediately 
recognized the legality of slave marriages upon the emancipation 
of the slave. Other jurisdictions required the passage of curative 
legislation before conferring legal status on slave marriages. 
The third section of Part IV will analyze states that adopted 
repudiation models which, following the end o f  the Civil War, 
allowed slaves to either confirm or abandon antebellum 
relationships. The final slave marriage legalization model in this 
section of the Article examines states that conferred the right to 
marry only upon the passage o f  legislation granting freed slaves 
the right to marry. 
A. Legal Recognition Model 
Slaves who resided in Northern states could avail themselves 
of the highest legal recognition o f  slave marriages. For example, in 
1809, the New York legislature legalized slave marriages.74 No 
longer recognized as mere contubernal relationships or quasi· 
marriages, the legislature, in contravention of common law, passed 
the Act o f  February 17,  1809 which provided: "all marriages 
contracted or which may hereafter be contracted, wherein one or 
more of the parties was, were, or may be slaves, shall be 
considered equally valid, as though the parties thereto were free, 
and the child or children of any such marriage shall be deemed 
legitimate . . . . "75 
" 
The S�preme Court of New York in Jackson u. Lervey, cited 
sound pohcy and a regard to the p ublic morals" as the reasons 
underlying the legislature's departure from the traditional 
treatment of slave relationships. 76 The court broadly interpreted 
the l
_
angu8:ge o� the Act, and held that it legalized not only 
marriages m existence at the passage of the Act, but a lso applied 
73. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN (Simon & Shuster 1995) 74. Act of Feb. 17'. 1�09 �.Y. Laws (legalizing slave marriages). · 
. 7h
5
t
. 
t
ld. The only hm1tation on the applicability of this statute was that the ng o marry was not "deemed t d · slaves." Id. See Marbletown v 
K
i
or cons rue to manumit any such slave or 
the Act does not "operate as 
· ngs�on, . 20 Johns 1, 2-3 (1822) (noting that an emancipation") 76. Jackson v. Lervey, 5 Cow. 397, (N.Y. Su�. Ct. 1826). 
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retroactively to legalize marriages that terminated upon the death 
ofa spouse prior to the passage of the Act.77 
Tennessee was the only Confederate state which recognized 
that slaves, notwithstanding their inability to contract, were 
entitled to a limited right to marry.78 The idea that slaves were 
merely chattel was rejected as inconsistent with the state's 
"enlightened" position that the legislation and jurisprudence of 
Tennessee was "shaped with a view to ameliorate the condition of 
the slave, and to protect him against the tyranny or cruelty of the 
master and all other persons."79 The rules governing slave life in 
Tennessee incorporated the slave's personhood into the bondage 
relationship and modified slaves' legal status to that of an "agent 
of their owners."80 The Supreme Court in Andrews v. Page, noted 
that "under our modified system of slavery, slaves are not mere 
chattels, but are regarded in the two-fold character of persons and 
property . . . .  "81 In furtherance of this paternalistic approach to 
slavery, Tennessee adopted a form of "de facto" marriage which 
gave slave couples a limited opportunity to enjoy the benefits of 
traditional marital unions.82 
The Tennessee Supreme Court in Brown v. Cheatham noted 
that standard obj ections to slave marriages such as the "want of 
freedom of will and of the paramount duties of the slave to his 
owner,,aa had no applicability when the "owners have consented to 
the marriage."84 Once consent was granted , "the marriage of slaves 
is a valid and legal marriage, and the issue legitimate . ..s5 Not only 
was consent a necessary prerequisite to legalize the marriage, it 
was also required before the slave marriage could be dissolved.86 
77. See id. (declaring retroactive validity and legitimacy to both pre-Act 
marriages and children). 
78. Andrews, 50 Tenn. at 662 
79. See id. (concluding that "numerous authorities . . .  show that slaves, 
although regarded as property and subject to many restrictions, never were 
considered by the courts of this State as standing on the same footing as 
horses, cattle, and other personal property"). 
80. Id. Slaves have certain rights even though they are the agents of their 
owners and not always in service. Id. 
81. See id. (asserting that Tennessee's modified slavery system dictates 
that slaves are "persons" with certain rights that are granted to them by law 
and through owner consent). 
82. See Brown v. Cheatham, 17 S.W. 1033, 1034 (1891) (asserting that 
slaves could indeed commence a "de facto" marriage whereby many of the 
statutory marriage effects obtain) (emphasis in original). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. See id. at 1034-35 (emphasizing the absolute necessity of owner consent 
in slave marriage dissolution). In addition, the court stated, "(t]he permanent 
separation of a slave couple by act of the master, though not consented to by 
the parties, as where the husband or wife was sold to another state, operated 
necessarily to dissolve the relation." Id. 
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Following emancipation of the slaves and the passage of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, the owner's consent no longer governed 
the formation or dissolution of slave re lationships. Tennessee 
affected the postbellum ratification of slave marriages with the 
passage of the Act of 1866.87 The impact of the Act of 1 866 o
_
n slave 
relationships was two-fold. First, Section Five of the Act ratified de 
facto slave marriages and legitimized the children borne of those 
relationships.88 The Act provided, in pertinent part: 
That all free persons of color who were living together as husband 
and wife in this State, while in a state of slavery, are hcn'by 
declared to be man and wife , and their children legitimately entitled 
to an inheritance in any property heretofore acquired or that may 
hereafter be acquired by said parents , to as full an extent as the 
children of white citizens are now entitled, by the existing laws of 
this State.89 
Second, the most significant impact of the Act was the grant 
of equal rights to freed persons of color residing in Tennessee.'"' 
These rights included "the right to make and enforce contracts, to 
sue and be sued, to be parties and give evidence, to inherit a nd to 
have full and equal benefits of all laws and proceed ings for the 
security of person and estate . . . . "91 Inherent in the granting of the 
right to contract was the right to marry in accordance with the 
laws of Tennessee. 92 
87. Act of May 26, 1866, Sec. 5, 1 866 Tenn. Laws (defining the term "free 
person of color" and to declare the rights of such persons). The act included 
legitimizing the children of slaves. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Questions about the validity of slave marriages arose in both civil and 
criminal contexts. See McReynolds v .  State, 45 Tenn. 18 (1867) (appealing 
slave's conviction for bigamy arising from multiple marriages entered into 
prior to his emancipation). While i n  a condition of slavery, the plaintiff 
married a slave in 1856 with the consent of their respective owners. Id. They 
lived together until approximately January 1, 1867. Id. Thereafter on January 
17, 1867, plaintiff, having been emancipated, obtained a marriage license, and 
married a freed slave. Id. The Court in McReynolds held that "municipal law 
did not recognize the rites of marriage between slaves." Id. at 20. This portion 
of the opinion was clearly in error, and overturned by the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee three years later. Andrews u. Page, 50 Tenn. 653 ( 1870). 
Subsequent to emancipation, however, the Court noted that slave marriages 
could become legally binding upon ratification by examining the antebellum 
and postbellum state of mind of the slave couple. McReynolds, 45 Tenn. at 22. 
The common law articulation of the ratification test required "the declared 
assent of the mind to the act of marriage, which makes it legal. Such as 
declare their assent shall be bound." Id. This approach was codified in the Act 
of May 26, 1866, which ratified dormant slave marriages where the 
relationship remained viable after emancipation and legitimized the children 
born of such relationships. Id. at 24-5. Having determined that the lower court 
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B. Dormancy Model 
The right of slaves to marry in a number of jurisdictions was 
not created by legislative or judicial action ,  but was restored to 
slaves upon either their emancipation or as a result of curative 
legislation enacted at the end of the Civil War. In these 
jurisdictions, courts focused on the diminished status of slaves 
arising from their lack of contractual capacity. The judiciaries and 
legislatures in these jurisdictions adopted natural rights principles 
when determining that slaves had the right to enter into intra­
racial marital relationships, but lacked the ability to exercise that 
right by legalizing those relationships. This right remained 
dormant or inactive until the disability was removed through 
emancipation or curative legislation.93 
1. Emancipation 
Louisiana adopted a form of the dormancy model as early as 
1819 with the decision of Girod v. Lew is.94 With that decision, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court established the basis for moral marriage 
which included an agreement between the slave couple with the 
master's consent.95 Such marriage did not "produce any civil 
effect," but it was a departure from the prohibition on slave 
marriage codified in 1807.96 In 1819, Girod n oted that: 
Emancipation gives to the slave his civil rights, and a contract of 
marriage, legal and valid by the consent of the master and moral 
assent of the slave, from the moment of freedom, although dormant 
during the slavery, produces all the effects which result from such 
contract among free persons.97 
erroneously applied the law governing slave marriages, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial to determine 
whether the first slave marriage was ratified after emancipation and thus 
valid at the time the plaintiff entered into his second marriage. Id. at 26. 
93. See generally Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An 
Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221, 2 7 2  (1999)(indulging wholesale 
in the legal fiction underlying dormancy doctrine believing that they could 
conduct inquiries into the permanence and stability of relationships defined by 
law as transitional and unstable). Significantly, these statutes legitimized the 
children born from these relationships, terminating claims able to be made 
against the state for support. Id. The disciplinary effects of these statutes on 
black sexual relationships exposed the newly freed to prosecutions for bigamy, 
adultery, and fornication accompanied by cultural condemnations of 
promiscuity and uncivilized behavior. Id. 
94. Girod v. Lewis, 6 Mart. 559, 559-60 (1819). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. The Act of 1807 prohibited both slave and freed blacks from not 
only marrying, but celebrating such unions. See An Act Concerning the 
Celebration of Marriages, Ch. 13 § 17 (1807) (noting that "free persons and 
slaves are incapable of contracting marriage together, the celebration of such 
is forbidden, and the marriage is void."). 
97. Girod, 6 Mart. at 559-60. 
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After Girod, the Louisiana legislature modifie� its sta
nce .on 
slave marriage, and in 1825 adopted Civil Code Article 182
 wh1c
.
h 
rovided that "slaves cannot marry without the consent of the
ir 
�
asters and their marriages do not produce any of the civil effects 
which r�sult from such contract s . "98 It was these 'moral marriages' 
that were recognized by the Louisiana legislature and j udiciary as 
worthy of legalization upon the e mancipatio.
n o� slave couples
_
.!)'
� 
Following the Civil War and emanc1pat10n, the Lo�1sia�a 
legislature legalized moral marriages that were entered mto m 
either "private or religious" ceremonies. 100 Louisiana i mposed t�e 
additional requirement that the moral marriage had to be m 
existence "at the time the emancipation takes place." 10 1 Once 
emancipated, the civil consequences of the moral marriage became 
effective, and related back "to the date of the original 
marriage."102Using the Louisiana decision of Girod as their guide, 
the following states (listed alphabetically) adopted similar 
dormancy models in which emancipation was viewed as the 
triggering event necessary for restoring the right to marry upon 
1 fr d 1 Al b 103 M l d 10• M · · 
wr. d new y e e  s aves: a ama, ary an , issoun, an 
98. Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, Article 182 ( 1825). 
99. Id. 
100. Act of 1 868, § 1, An Act Relative to Marriages (providing that all private 
or religious marriages contracted in this State prior to the passage of this act 
shall be valid and binding and have the same force and effect as if the 
marriages had been contracted as prescribed by the laws then existing). The 
Act of 1868 then provided that slave couples were required to acknowledge 
their moral marriage before a notary public or other authorized governmental 
entity before 1870. Id. However, Louisiana courts did not strictly construe this 
provision. In 1882, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Ross v. Ross, 34 La. Ann. 
860, 862 (La. 1882), found that a slave couple who morally married in 1842, 
with the consent of their owner, and later continued to live together after 
emancipation, were legally married notwithstanding their failure to comply 
with the declaration requirements of the 1868 Act. The same result was 
reached in 1910 in the Successwn of George Deuezin, 7 Orleans App. 1 1 1, 1910 
(La.App.Orleans 1910), where the Louisiana Court of Appeals held that: 
Id. 
Constant cohabitation or living together after emancipation has been 
held to be sufficient proof of ratification by conduct, and it is doubtful 
whether ratification by formal declaration before a notary public in 
conformity with the Act of 1868 is at all necessary in a case where there 
has in fact been a slave marriage formally and publicly celebrated with 
the consent and approval of the master. 
101. Pierre v. Fontenette, 25 La. Ann. 6 17, (La. 1873). 
102. Ross, 34 La. Ann. at 862 (noting that the civil effects of such marriages 
were dormant during slavery, and that emancipation operated not a creation 
or birth of such rights, but merely an awakening of them). 
103. Alabama engaged in a circuitous path before recognizing the legitimacy 
of slave marriages. In 1854, the Alabama Supreme Court held that 
relationship between slaves was merely contubernal unions that were "not 
marriage, or evidence of marriage." Malinda and Sarah v. Gardner, 24 Ala. 
719 (Ala. 1854). Sixteen years later the Court's perspective on this issue 
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underwent a dramatic change. In Stikes v. Swanson, 44 Ala. 633, 636 (Ala. 
1870), the Alabama Supreme Court overturned its previous decisions on this 
issue, and recognized "legal quasi marriages" between slaves. One reason 
underlying the decision in Stikes may be that Alabama's slave code also 
acknowledged that slaves were persons, as well as items of property, and as 
such the court sought to grant to slaves a modicum of the natural rights that 
slavery stripped away. Id. at 636-37. Although this decision was short lived, 
the Court in Stikes held that the condition of bondage did not deprive slaves of 
their "natural right" to marry. Id. at 636. In Stikes, the court adopted the 
dormancy model of Louisiana's decision in Girod, and held that 
"[e)mancipation has restored the former slave to his natural rights. The reason 
of the old cases is overturned, and the constructions upon which they rested 
fail to do justice to the citizen. This of itself is a sufficient reason to abandon 
them." Id. at 637. The Stikes decision was followed six years later by Cantelou 
v. Doe, 56 Ala. 5 19, 52 1-22 (Ala. 1876), which overturned Stikes and 
reaffirmed the longstanding principle that the slave was incapable of entering 
into any contract, not excepting the contract of marriage. See generally 
KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE­
BELLUM SOUTH 192 ( 1956) (noting Alabama's legal code of 1852 had two 
clauses that recognized the dual nature of the slave). The first clause 
confirmed his status as property and required his obedient compliance with all 
lawful commands. Id. Masters relied upon the law of the state to use its power 
against white men who 'tampered' with their bondsmen, and against 
bondsmen they could not subdue. Id. "Courts, police, and militia were 
indispensable parts of the machinery of control." Id. The second clause 
acknowledged the slave's status as a person. Id. The law required that 
masters be humane, furnish adequate food and clothing, and provide care 
during sickness and old age. Id. The state endowed masters with duties as 
well as rights and assumed some responsibility for the welfare of the 
bondsmen. Id. 
104. The state of Maryland addressed the issue of slave marriages one year 
after the Declaration of Independence was signed. The Act of 1777 permitted 
slaves to marry upon receipt of their master's consent. Act of 1777, Ch. 12, 
§ XI. The act states :  
Id. 
That if any Minister shall willfully publish the Banns of Marriage 
between any Servants, or between a free Person and a Servant, or if he 
shall willingly celebrate the Rites of Matrimony between any such, 
without Leave of the Master or Mistress of such Servant, he shall forfeit 
and pay for every Offense fifty Pounds current Money. 
Although Maryland courts recognized the limited validity of these 
marriages, the slave's incapacity served as an impediment to civil recognition 
of the marriage. Id. See Jones, 36 Md. at 455 (Md. 1872) (noting that the Act of 
1777 authorized slaves to marry with the assent of their owners even though 
the marriage would not confer civil rights upon them or affect the relation of 
master and slave); See also David Jones v. Henry Jones, 45 Md. 144, Cl':1d. 
1876) (noting that the Act of 1777 prohibited ministers from performmg 
marital celebrations between servants or a servant and a free person without 
the master's consent but did not declare, or by operation of law, make the 
marriage void). "The
' 
minister subjected himself to a fine, but the_ marriage 
was valid." Id. at 159.  Following emancipation, Maryland analogized slave 
marriages to those of other persons lacking capacity su�h as. "lunatics and infants," and treated the rights associated with these relatio�s�1ps �s _dor_mant until such time a s  slaves were freed and capable of exerc1smg civil nghts. 
Jones, 36 Md. at 456. Once vested with civil rights upon emancipation, slaves 
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Texas.106 The states of Alabama,
101 Maryland, and Missouri 
were permitted to ratify these marriages by continuing to "live together as 
husband and wife" without "any other or new celebration." Id. Unable to 
marry, slaves lived together in a peculiar relation called contuberium, which 
conferred no civil rights, but once emancipated, the offspring of this connection 
were capable of inheriting from each other and from their parents. Id. 
105. Many state legislatures passed postbellum legislation that ratified slave 
marriages after emancipation as long as the relationships continued after 
passage of the acts. Missouri, however, took a different approach. The 
Missouri legislature passed an Act that imposed an obligation upon slave 
couples who lived together in a marital relationship to solemnize their 
relationship and record notice of the same with the county recorder. See Act of 
February 20, 1865, Miscellaneous: Marital Rights, An Act in relation to the 
marital rights and children of colored persons (imposing an obligation upon 
slave couples who lived together to solemnize their relationship and record 
notice with the county recorder). The Act of 1865 provided in pertinent part: 
That in all cases where persons of color heretofore held as slaves in the 
State of Missouri have cohabited together as husband and wife, it shall 
be the duty of persons thus cohabiting to appear before a justice of the 
peace of the township where they reside, or before any other officer 
authorized to perform the ceremony of marriage, and it shall be the duty 
of such officer to join in marriage the persons thus applying, and to keep 
a record of the same. 
Id. at § 1.  
The Missouri Act required slave couples to comply with its terms on or 
before February 1866, or risk liability from a criminal prosecution. Id. at § 6. 
In 1920, the Missouri Supreme Court in Erwin v. Nolan interpreted the 
requirements imposed on slave couples after emancipation. 2 1 7  S.W. 837 (Mo. 
1920) (holding that when confirmation by cohabitation or otherwise was 
present, substantial grounds existed for declaring a marriage binding). The 
court in Erwin recognized the validity of both common law ratification of 
dormant slave marriages as well as the statutory mandate of the Marriage Act 
of 1865. Id. The court in Erwin stated: 
If, therefore, persons in bondage lived together as husband and wife and 
during that status were married according to the usage established for 
the marriage of slaves, their subsequent mutual acknowledgment of the 
relat�on after their emancipation should be held to complete the act of 
ma�n��ny so as to make them lawfully married from the time when 
their hvmg together as husband and wife commenced 
Erwin, 217 S.W. at 841. 
· 
106. Until ju�icial and legislative recognition of slave marriages became the 
norm, Texas viewed these relationships as contubernal s T' · L 
30 T 
· ee imm1ns v. acy, ex. 1 15, 136 (Tex. 1867) (discussing the e=ect of e · t' th · h f 
111 manc1pa ion on e ng ts o slave.s to contract and marry). The court in Timmins stated Contubern�sm was the matr.imony of slaves; a permitted cohabitation not partaking �f la�ful marriage, which they could not contract Th� progress �f so�iety m civilization, more correct notions on the s�b·� t f mo
_
r�l obligation, and, above all, the benign influenc f h 
�- c . 0 
rehgion, have softened man of the . 
e o t e chnstian 
the ancients. But the right/of the sl�;�
r� attendant on sl8:very among 
acquisition of property by way of inherit m respect t? marnage �nd the 
the same ground. These authorit' 
ance, remam substantially on 
permitted cohabitation existing fo 
ies �how very conclusively that the 
not partake of lawful marriage.
r�e:.,� ac:��J our slave popula.tion did 
husband and wife, parent and child . 
say the legal nghts of 
' sprmg from these connections, it 
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must also be held that corresponding disabilities flow from them, many 
of which are of a severely penal character, affecting almost this entire 
portion of our population. 
Id. 
The dormancy model adopted in the Louisiana decision in Girod served as 
guidance for the Supreme Court of Texas when it initially addressed this issue 
in Timmons. Under this model, the validity of the marriage was determined by 
examining several elements, including whether the parties continued to 
cohabit as husband and wife after emancipation. See Cumby v. Garland, 25 
S.W. 673, 675 (Tx. 1894) (concluding that the marriage of appellant's father 
and mother was rendered complete and valid by the voluntary continuance of 
the relation of husband and wife after their emancipation); Coleman v.  
Vollmer, 31 S.W. 413,414 (1895) (holding that appellant and his wife were 
incapable of forming or entering into the marriage contract while slaves but 
they recognized and ratified the marriage relation when emancipated, and 
again when the constitution and law of their state proclaimed that they were 
man and wife). The court in Timmons held: 
[M]ost certainly emancipation can have this effect only in such 
connections as are existing between slaves at the time it takes place. 
Indeed, the only ground upon which the decision can be maintained is 
that the assent manifested by their continued cohabitation, after 
acquiring capacity to contract, gives validity to the existing relation, 
sanctioned by moral, though not by legal obligation. 
Timmons. 30 Tex, at 1 15. 
In 1869, the validity of slave marriages was finally resolved by the Texas 
legislature with the adoption of the Constitution of 1869. TEX. CONST. art. 12, 
§27 (Vernon 1869). This statute validated the marital relations of former slave 
couples where the couples continued to cohabit at the time of passage of the 
Constitution. Id. I t  also applied retroactively to validate slave marriages 
where one of the spouses died prior to the passage of the curative legislation. 
Id. 
107. In 1867, the Alabama legislature finally addressed the legalization of 
slave marriage by passing the Act of November 30, 1867 which retroactively 
ratified marriages entered into by slaves prior to emancipation. In 
conjunction, ordinance No. 23 provided that as long as slave couples continued 
to live together "as man and wife," at the passage of the Act of November 30, 
1867, such marriages were "hereby ratified and made valid." An Ordinance of 
September 29, 1865, No. 39, p. 64 (adopted as Revised Code of Alabama, No. 
39) (ratifying marriages between freedmen and freedwomen). The ordinance 
states in part: 
Id. 
All marriages between freedmen and freedwomen, whether in a state of 
slavery or since their emancipation, heretofore solemnized by any one 
acting or officiating as a minister, or any one claiming to exercise the 
right to solemnize the rites of matrimony, whether bond or free, are 
hereby ratified and made valid, provided the parties are now living 
together as man and wife; and in all cases of freedmen and freedwomen 
who are now living together recognizing each other as man and wife, be 
it ordained that the same are hereby declared to be man and wife, and 
bound by the legal obligations of such relationship. 
In Washington v. Washington, 69 Ala. 281 ( 1881), the Supreme Court of 
Alabama was the first court in the state to thoroughly address this issue. The 
Alabama Legislature codified the dormancy paradigm in 1867 when it passed 
the Act of November 30, 1867 which provided that "freedmen and women who 
shall now be living together as man and wife, shall be regarded in law as man 
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adopted similar philosophical approaches to restoring the right to 
marry for emancipated slav e s . 108 Typically, antebell':1m and 
postbellum laws and jurispru de nce 
,
�iewed s�ave marr:ages as 
merely contubernal unions that w ere not marriage, o: evidence of 
marriage."109 Relying upon the dormancy pa�adigm, c?urts 
analogized the right of slaves to marry with the rights associated 
with infants and lunatics. 1 1° Characteristic of all three groups, the 
right to marry was viewed as "inchoate and imperfect,"  pending 
removal of the relevant infirmity. 1 1 1  In the case of slaves, 
emancipation restored their complete bundle of civil ri?ht
1
�
-� 
and 
the slave couple was therefore d eemed husband and wife. - The 
Missouri Supreme Court in Johnson v. Johnson concluded that: 
Emancipation gave to the slave his civil rights, and a contract of 
marriage, legal and valid by the consent of the master and moral 
assent of the slave, from the moment of freedom, although dormant 
during the slavery, produced all the effects which resulted from such 
a contract among free persons.113 
2. Legislation 
A number of jurisdictions recognized the marriages of freed 
slaves only after passage oflegislation restoring the right to marry 
to these emancipated slaves. In these jurisdictions , the dormant 
and wife." Act of November 30, 1867 (regarding marriages between freedmen 
and freedwomen); Ordinance No. 23 of Convention of 1867, Session Laws of 
Alabama, 1868, page 175. This Act legalized marriages between freed slaves, 
legitimatized children of both "black and mixed color," and voided any 
"prosecutions for bigamy, adultery and fornication" instituted as a result of the 
purported relations. Id. The Ordinance of November 30, 1867 was extended 
until July 13,  1869 by the Act of December 3 1 ,  1868. Act Number 183 of 
Convention of 1867, Session Laws of Alabama, 1868, page 527. 
108. Id. 
109. See Malinda and Sarah v. Gardner, 24 Ala. 719, 724 (1854) (permitting 
cohabitation among slaves called contubernium, but not conferring civil 
rights). "It conferred no rights upon the offspring, and created no legal 
disabilities on the part of the father from forming a valid marriage, whenever 
he became in a condition which would authorize him to contract one." Id. at 
704. In 1870, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that a marriage entered into 
by slaves "was absolutely void in legal contemplation." Johnson v. Johnson, 45 
Mo. 595, 599 ( 1870). Although the court acknowledged the moral viability of 
slave marriage, the court, citing decisions from a number of jurisdictions, 
including Alabama and Kentucky, concluded that marriage between slaves 
was "necessarily incompatible with the nature of slavery . . . .  " Id. 
110. Washington, 69 Ala. at 283 
111. Id. 
112. See id. at 285-86. (citing the Louisiana decision in Girod). The court 
held that "emancipation gives to the slave his civil rights; and a contract of 
marriage, legal and valid by the consent of the master and moral assent of the 
slave, from the moment of freedom, although dormant in slavery, produces all 
effects which result from such contracts among free persons." Id. 
113. Johnson, 45 Mo. at 600-0 1. 
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right to marry was triggered not by emancipation, but by 
legislative action. The states of Kentucky, Virginia, and South 
Carolina all followed this approach. 
Slave couples living in Kentucky who joined together in 
putative antebellum marriages were not permitted to legally 
marry until February 14, 1866, when the state passed legislation 
specifically addressing this issue. 1 14 Section 2 of the Act of 1866 
provided that such relationships would be deemed lawful 
marriages if the slave couple had "heretofore lived and cohabited, 
and do now live together as husband and wife . . . . "115 The Act 
imposed an affirmative duty upon the slave couple to appear 
before the county clerk, pay a nominal fee, and declare "that they 
have been, and desire to continue, living together as husband and 
wife . . . .  "116 Upon the issuance of the certificate of declaration, the 
slave couple would have proof that their marriage was a legally 
recognized union, and that their children were legitimate.111 The 
Court of Appeals of Kentucky noted: 
The effect of their declaration was to legalize the customary 
marriage, and not to institute a new marriage between them. The 
statute declares that they shall be taken and held as legally 
married, and that their issue shall be held to be legitimate. The 
intention of the legislature was to protect and maintain, as far as 
possible, the domestic relations of that class of the population of 
the state, and in effect declared that their former cohabitation, 
when accompanied by an intention, expressed in the mode 
indicated in the statute, to continue the relation previously 
existing between them, should have the same effect as if they had 
been originally legally married.118 Kentucky jurisprudence on the 
validity of slave relationships reflect the judiciary's recognition 
that the right of former slaves to marry was an important 
evolutionary step in the socialization and assimilation of former 
slaves into the postbellum legal framework of America. In Ewing 
v. Bibb,119 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky noted: 
Hence when the quasi husband and wife by their emancipation 
became competent to contract marriage, the highest duty which they 
owed to themselves, their children, and to morality was to 
consummate and make perfect a union which had hitherto existed 
only by reason of the consent and approbation of their owners. 120 
Immediately following the general slave emancipation, the 
114. The Laws of Kentucky, Chapter 556, An Act in relation to the marriage 
of negroes and mulattoes, Act of February 14, 1866, page 37. 
115. Id. The Act also legitimized children born of said relationships. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. See Stewart v. Munchandler, 65 Ky. 278, 281. 
118. Dowd v. Hurley, 78 Ky. 260, 262 ( 1880). 
119. Ewing v. Bibb, 70 Ky. 654 (1870). 
120. Id. at 656. 
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legislatures of Virginia and South Carolina also passed
 curative 
statutes that conferred legal recognition upon putative
 slave 
marriages entered in to during the Civil War. 
tl t The primary focus 
of legislation adopted by the aforementioned jurisdictions 
pertained to the standard of proof required to demonstrate the 
existence of a marital union worthy of legal recognition. 
122 
The curative act passed by the Virginia legislature recognized 
marriages entered into by agreement of the parties, even absent a 123 Th formal ceremony to solemnize the same. e agreement to marry 
could be either express or implied by the "acts, conduct, and 
conversation of the parties . "124 When determining the existence of a 
slave marriage by implication, Virginia courts considered such 
factors as duration of cohabitation, reputation as married couple 
by members of community and extended family, public 
acknowledgment by couple of relationship to each other, and the 
conception and rearing of children during the union. 125 An express 
indication of a slave couple's intent to marry was generally 
demonstrated by their participation in a "jumping the broom" 
ceremony or some other informal public solemnization of their 
union by a preacher or the plantation's master. 126 
The legalization model adopted by the state of South Carolina 
was similar to Virginia's model in many respects. South Carolina's 
statute applied retroactively by recognizing that the right to marry 
laid dormant during the period i n  which slaves lacked the capacity 
121. See Scott v. Raub, 14 S.E. 1 78, 179 (Va. 1891) (stating that "as has been 
said, such a marriage is allowed a certain moral force, and may be confirmed 
after emancipation."). 
122. Id. 
123. Section 2, Chapter 18, Act of February 27, 1866, codified as Code of 
1873, ch. 103, § 4, p. 941. The act states: 
Id. 
(W]here �olored persons . . .  shall have undertaken and agreed to occupy 
the relat10n to each other of husband and wife, and shall be cohabiting 
together as such at the time of its passage, whether the rites of marriage 
shall have been _celebrated between them or not, they shall be deemed 
hus?and and w1�e, and be entitled to the rights and privileges, and 
subJect to the duties and obligations of that relation in like manner as if 
they had been duly married by law . . . .  
124. Francis v. Francis,  7� Va. 283, 287 ( 1879). See Lemons v. Harris, 80 S.E. 740, 741 (Va. 1914) ( It is not necessary under the Act to prove an agreemen� · · · [but on�] may be established by the acts conduct and conversat10n of the parties."). ' ' 
125. Francis, 72 Va. at 287-88 (1879). See Fitchett and Afs v. Smith's Adm'r a�d Als, 78 "."a. 524 Cl_884) (holding that sufficient cohabitation as man and wife along with sufficient recognition of the father child I t" h"  enough to I ·t· 
· th h"ld) 
- re a 10ns ip were egi imize e c 1 . ; Smith v. Perry, 80 Va. 563 ( 1 885) (concludin all that was needed to establish a marriage under the A t 
g 
b l d c was an agreement y co ore persons to carry on as husband and "fi ) 126. Perry, 80 Va. At 563. 
WI e .  
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to contract while in a state of bondage. 121 Additionally, South 
Carolina legalization statutes did not require slave couples to 
participate in any type of formal solemnization ceremony.128 The 
marriages could be determined by either express agreement or by 
implication.129 Finally, the statutory framework recognized that 
children born of such relationships were legitimatized, at least by 
the mother .130 
The curative acts adopted by South Carolina's legislature 
differed from legislation passed by other jurisdictions because it 
only legalized "moral marriages" between freed slaves.131 The 
127. An Act to Establish and Regulate the Domestic Relations of persons of 
Color, and to amend the law in relation to Paupers and vagrancy, Act of 1865, 
December 21, 1865 , 13 Stat. 269. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. "Every colored child, heretofore born, is declared to be the legitimate 
child of his mother, and also of his colored father, if he is acknowledged by 
such a father." Id. 
131. Subsequent to emancipation and the passage of the Act of 1865, South 
Carolina legalized putative slave marriages and legitimized children born 
from such unions. An Act to Establish and Regulate the Domestic Relations of 
persons of Color, and to amend the law in relation to Paupers and vagrancy, 
Act of 1865, December 2 1 ,  1865, 13 Stat. 269. "Every colored child, heretofore 
born, is declared to be the legitimate child of his mother, and also of his 
colored father, if he is acknowledged by such a father." Id. The Supreme Court 
of South Carolina addressed the constitutional validity of the Act of 1865 in 
Davenport v. Caldwell, 10 S.C. 317 ( 1878), and noted: 
Id. 
The power of the State to remove disabilities which its own power had 
imposed, and of the Legislature to validate Acts which at the time, by 
reason of then existing laws, were null and void, is well recognized. 
Indeed, it is difficult to perceive real difference in principle, so far as the 
legislative power is concerned, between the Act of 1865 validating 
marriages entered into by slaves during slavery- slavery having, prior to 
the Act of 1865, been abolished by the Constitution of the State-between 
that Act and the Act of the Legislature in Connecticut validating 
marriages which by law were null and void ab initio. 
In 1866, South C arolina repealed a portion of the 1865 Act, and later in 
1872 completely repealed the 1865 Act. An act to declare the rights of persons 
of lately known as slaves and as free persons of color, Act of 1866, September 
21, 1866, 13 Stat. 393. The Act of 1872, entitled "An Act legalizing certain 
marriages, and for other purposes therein mentioned,'' formed the framework 
for South Carolina's legislative and judicial efforts to confer legal status on 
slave marriages. Davenport, 10 S.C. at 330. The Act of 1872 provides, in 
pertinent part: 
All persons in this State who, previous to their actual emancipation, had 
undertaken and agreed to occupy the relation to each other of husband 
and wife and are cohabiting as such, or in any way recognizing the 
relation as still existing at the time of the passage of this Chapter, 
whether the rites of marriage have been celebrated or not, shall be 
deemed husband and wife, and be entitled to all the rights and 
privileges, and be subject to all the duties and obli�ations o� that 
relation, in like m anner as if they had been duly married accordmg to 
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Supreme Court of South Carolina defined "mor�l marri�ges" .as 
those relationships where by c o nduct or declarat10r:is, the parties 
had agree d  to occupy towards each other the relati?n of husband 
and wife."132 In this context the only absent variable was the 
k . 1 1 ,,133 "power of contract to ma e it ega . 
The 1872 Act expressly distinguished ''concubinage" 
relationships from "moral marriages," and indicated that per�;ons 
living in concubinage unions were not entitled to legal i zat.ion 
under these statutes.134 The postbellum courts in South Carolina 
noted that concubinage relationships were based in part on an 
agreement to live together cou pled with cohabitation based upon 
that agreement. 135 To identify a moral marriage, the courts focused 
on the aforementioned elements, but also evaluated the n ature of 
the agreement reached betwee n  the couple to determine if they 
had the "moral intention to assume the duties incident to 
• ,,136 marriage. 
law. 
Davenport, 1 0  S.C. at 330. 
132. Clement v. Riley, 11 S.E. 699, 701 ( 1890). See also Rober.�on t'. 
McCauley, 39 S.E. 570, 573 (190 1 )  (stating that it was well-known and 
universally acknowledged historical fact that slaves of different sexes were in 
the habit of entering into such relations, frequently through formal marriage 
ceremonies, and with the consent of their owners). "These relations, when thus 
assumed between slaves, are termed moral marriages, lacking only the power 
to contract to make them legal marriages." Id. 
133. Roberson, supra note 132 at 573. 
134. See Act of Mar. 12, 1872, S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-30 (2004) (indicating 
that the statute shall not be deemed to extend to persons who have agreed to 
live in concubinage after their emancipation). See Myers v. Ham, 20 S.C. 522 
(1884)(explaining that only the intention of the parties to the slave marriage 
are controlling in determining its existence). The court stated: 
Id. 
Now this question is not to be determined by what the neighbors and 
community considered them; but did Roanoke and Delia undertake and 
agree to occupy the relation to each other of husband and wife, and were 
they cohabiting as such? He says she did. She says she did not. I am 
disposed to think this is not the marriage contemplated by the act of 
1872. Certainly Roanoke, by his own act, corroborates his wife. He did 
not consider Delia his wife, for he not only said he never married her, 
but has actually married another woman by the rites of the church. I 
must, therefore, conclude that these persons are properly in the words of 
the act as 'persons who have agreed to live in concubinage after their 
emancipation.' 
135. Watson v. Ellerbe, 57 S.E. 855 ( 1907); Myers v. Ham, 2 0  S.C. 522 
(1884). 
136. See Watson, 57 S.E. at 856 (noting that the intent to create a marriage 
was controlling). The court stated: 
Suffice it to say here that it was a term applied to a relation between 
slaves who, although they had no p ower to make the marriage contract, 
yet came together and agreed to live as man and wife. The essence of 
such an agreement was that it be bona fide and that the parties act in 
accordance with it. Otherwise a moral marriage did not exist. The 
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Although curative, the statute's larger impact was that the 
legal recognition of these relationships related back to their 
antebellum formation. As long as the slave couple was able to 
satisfy the statutory requirements, the dormant rights inuring as 
a result of the marriage became effective upon the passage of the 
acts. In addition to the importance of this grant of one of the 
earliest civil rights, the legislative recognition of the marriage also 
legitimized the children born prior to the passage of the 
legislation, and permitted the legitimized children to gain paternal 
inheritance rights. 
C. Repudiation Model 
A number of Confederate states passed postbellum legislation 
recognizing the validity of slave marriages and legitimating the 
children born therefrom. These slave marriage statutes were 
simply drafted to reflect that following emancipation, marriages 
between slaves were automatically validated without further 
solemnization or license. The Supreme Courts of Illinois and Ohio, 
however, validated slave marriage only upon a showing that the 
marriage had not been repudiated by one or both of the parties 
following emancipation.137 
In the seminal case of Butler v. Butler, the Illinois Supreme 
Court adopted the repudiation model to govern an intestacy 
dispute between the slave marriage widow and children borne of 
that relationship and the widow and children from the second 
marriage.138 In this case, a slave, Allen Butler, married a freed 
woman in 1841.139 The marriage lasted until 1851 when Butler was 
sold and relocated to Ohio.140 In 1854, Butler, then a freed man, 
entered into a second marriage with a free woman and 
subsequently lived with her in Ohio, and then in Illinois until his 
formal agreement in itself could not constitute moral marria�e, for if 
that were so all line of demarcation between such marnage and 
concubinage �ould disappear. An agreement and cohabitation for a 
week a month or a year would become a moral marriage. There must 
be th�t moral intention to assume the duties incident to marriage. The 
legislature had in mind only those cases in which there would have been 
a legal marriage had the parties had the power to contract. 
Id. 
137. See Lewis v. King, 54 N.E. 330, 332 (�899) (noting the effect of 
emancipation on slave marriages). The court explan�ed: 
E · · 1 hether general or special, apparently had no manc1pabon a one, w 
. . 
· d b h � t h l m· age But emanc1pat10n, accomparue y t e euec upon t e s ave ma · 1 · 
· 
to consent of the parties to a transmutation of the s ave
 mamage
_ 
m a 
l l t. d cohabitation had the effect of rendenng the ega one, or by con mue ' . 
imperfect slave marriage a valid and legal umon. 
Id. 
138. Butler v. Butler, 44 N.E. 203 (1896). 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
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death in 1893. 141 Butler died intestate, leaving several parcels of 
real property.142 The case came before the court to determine 
whether Butler's first wife and the children borne of that slave 
marriage, or his second wife and children, were his legitimate 
heirs at law . 143 
The Illinois Supreme Court initially recognized that, in the 
absence of contractual rights ,  marriages entered into during 
slavery were of no force or effect until such time after 
emancipation when the couple through affirmative acts, conduct or 
consent ratified the union. 144 The Butler court, noted: 
[I]f before emancipation, they were married in the form which either 
usage or law had established for the marriage of slaves, this 
subsequent mutual acknowledgment of each other as husband and 
wife should be held to complete the act of matrimony, so as to make 
them lawfully and fully married from the time at which this 
subsequent living together commenced. 145 
To determine whether the slave marriage w a s  ratified or 
repudiated by the parties, the court examined the antebellum and 
postbellum conduct and state of mind of the couple. 146 In Butler, 
both spouses to the slave m arriage entered into subsequent 
relationships following Butler's emancipation. 147 Butler first 
engaged in a number of relationships.148 
Butler was married to his second wife for almost 40 years.149 
The court reviewed the conduct of the parties to the first marriage, 
and concluded that such conduct "instead of affirming, expressly 
dis affirmed" the first marriage. 150 
Unlike traditional marriages, which could only be dissolved 
upon �eath or judicial decree, the parties' conduct, actions, or state 
of m
_
md were a�l 
_
sufficient methods of repudiating a slave 
�arriage. �epudiati�n had far reaching consequences. Unlike 
divorce which termmates a marriage, repudiation not only 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 204-05. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 205. 
148. Butler, 44 N.E. at 205. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. The court reasoned: 
By no act of Allen Butler after h · . . . 
marriage, but by his se�ond 
m is �manc1pat10n, d1? he affirm the slave 
laws of Ohio, he express! dis 
�rriage,
, 
celebrated m conformity to the 
his wife, Mariah, li
ved t� eth:/
rmed it. For near�y forty years he and 
wife. They had and reared �hildre:
nd were recognized as husband and 
slave marriage, by her cond t 
· · 
· �ary �n, the other party to the 
relations with another man b 
uc 
h
repudiated it also. She formed illicit 
Id. 
' Y w om she had several children. 
2006] The History of Slave Marriage in the United States 329 
nullified the marriage from its inception, but it also rendered the 
children borne from the relationship illegitimate .151 As a result, the 
court concluded that only Butler's second wife and children were 
his heirs at law .152 
In a similarly decided case, the Illinois Supreme Court in 
Middleton v. Middleton, held that the mere act of entering into 
another intimate relationship was not evidence of repudiation of a 
former slave rnarriage.153 In Middleton ,  the marriage of a slave 
couple that began in 1838 and ended with the death of the wife in 
1863 was deemed valid, notwithstanding the fact that the father 
sired a child in 1855 or 1856 from another relationship.154 The 
court held that because the first marriage was affirmed by the 
continued cohabitation of the parties, there was "no repudiation of 
the marriage by either of the parties thereto."155 
Contemporaneous with the common law decisions legalizing 
slave marriage, in 189 1 the Illinois legislature passed a statute 
that provided that slave marriages "shall be considered equally 
valid and binding as though the parties thereunto were free and 
the child or children of such marriages shall be deemed 
legitimate . . . .  "156 The Illinois Supreme Court in Prescott v. Ayers 
determined that the aim of the 1891 statute was to recognize as 
legally binding, voidable marriages that were affirmed by the 
slave couple. 157 
Ohio was one of only a few jurisdictions that, subsequent to 
the Civil War, did not address the issue of legalization of slave 
marriage through legislative act. The Supreme Court of Ohio 
adopted the repudiation model to determine the validity of slave 
marriages. In McDowell v. Sapp, 158 the court followed the 
prevailing school of thought as articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Hall v. United States, that it was "an inflexible 
rule of the law of African slavery, wherever it existed, that the 
slave was incapable of entering into any contract, not excepting 
the contract of marriage."159Although not legally binding, most 
151. Id. "Upon well recognized legal principles it follows also, that the 
disaffirmance of the slave marriage rendered it null from the beginning, to the 
same extent as would a decree of nullity rendered by a court of competent 
jurisdiction . . . . " Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Middleton v. Middleton, 77 N.E. 1 123, 1 124 (1906). 
154. Id. at 1 123. 
155. Id. at 1 124. 
156. See Act of May 15, 1891, p. 163, codified as Hurd's Rev. Stat. Ch. 89, 
§18, p. 961 (1893) (establishing the validity of marriages wher.e .one or both �f 
the parties were slaves at the time, and establishing the legitimacy of their 
offspring and right to inherit property). 
157. Prescott v. Ayers, 114 N.E. 557, 558-59 (1916).  
158. McDowell v.  Sapp, 39 Ohio St. 558, 561 ( 1 883). 
159. McDowell, 39 Ohio St. at 561 (citing Hall v. United States, 92 U.S. 27, 
30 (1875)). 
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jurisdictions, including Ohio, acknowledg�d the moral legitimacy 
of slave marriages. In this regard, Oh10 courts treated slave 
marriages as imperfect relationships that could be ratified or 
repudiated upon emancipation of the slave. 160 The court in 
McDowell noted that "a slave marriage becomes entirely valid by 
cohabitation subsequent to emancipation. 161 But in all these cases 
where there was no such ratification, the marriage might be 
avoided in some form."162 
D. Legislative Model 
The legislative process utilized by jurisdictions that conferred 
the right to marry upon slaves following the Civil War most closely 
parallels the campaign to legalize same-sex marriage. In both 
situations, state legislatures were called upon to exercise their 
authority to redefine the institution of marriage to reflect the 
evolving social and cultural dynamics of the time. Most of the 
jurisdictions examined for this Article that used the legislative 
model were members of the C onfederacy. Generally, these states 
rejected the idea that slaves possessed a dormant right to marry 
triggered by emancipation. Instead, these jurisdictions equated the 
right to marry with the legislative conference of other civil and 
contractual rights upon the slaves. 
Jurisdictions that adopted the legislative model to legalize 
slave marriages either expressly or implicitly rejected the 
dormancy model first affirmed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in 
Girod v. Lewis.163 In 1858 the North Carolina Supreme Court in 
Howard v. Howard164 distinguished Girod u. Lewis, 165 noting that: 
No authority is cited, and no reason is given for the decision, 
except the suggestion that the marriage, being dormant during the 
slavery, is endowed with full energy from the moment of freedom. 
We are forced to the conclusion, that the idea of civil rights being 
merely dormant during slavery, is rather a fanciful conceit, (we 
say it wi�h res�e�t) than the ground of a sound argument. It may 
be, that m Lomsiana, the marriage relation is greatly affected by 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. "A se_Paration at _or before emancipation, therefore, would properly be deemed a divorce. For. if the law takes cognizance of slave marriages, it must also of these slave divorces." Id. at 562. In McDowell th h b d f th 1 · d" 
, e us an rom e s ave marnage repu iated the same a s  a result f h" fr l d b . 
o is escape om s avery an su sequent relocation to Canada Id While in c d th c l te d · to 2 l  d · · 
ana a, e �ormer s ave en re m a year secon �arriage with another free woman of color. Id. The court held that by solemnizing a second marriage after he affected his esca�e fr�m
/,d
sla
t
v
5
e
6
ry
3
, the former slave spouse "effectually avoided the slave marnage. . a . 
163. 6 Mart. 559 ( 1819). 
164. 51 N.C. 235 (N.C. 1858). 
165. 6 Mart. 559 ( 1819). 
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the influence of religion, and the mystery of its supposed dormant 
rights, is attributable to its divine origin. If so, the case has no 
application, for, in our courts, marriage is treated as a mere civil 
institution.166lt was not until 1866 when North Carolina passed 
postbellum emancipation legislation which ratified and legalized 
slave relationships existing when the act was passed.167 Once 
ratified, the relationships were legally recognized retroactively "to 
the commencement of such cohabitation."168 Notwithstanding the 
legal benefit conferred upon former slave couples, the act also 
imposed an affirmative duty on the couple to publicly ratify the 
marriage by acknowledging the same before a pubic officer.169 
Although failure to file the public declaration did not negate the 
validity of the marriage, such failure could subject the couple to 
"indictable misdemeanors."170 As long as freed couples continued to 
166. Howard, 51 N.C. 235. 
167. See An Act Concerning Negroes and Persons of Color or of Mixed Blood, 
Act of March 10, 1866, Ch. 40, §5 (defining lawful marriage between recently 
emancipated slaves so that if the slaves "now cohabit together in the relation 
of husband and wife, the parties shall be deemed to have lawfully married as 
man and wife at the time of the commencement of such cohabitation, although 
they may not have been married in due form of law."). 
168. Act of March 10, 1866, Ch. 40, §5 (concerning negroes and persons of 
color or of mixed blood). See also State v. Harris, 63 N.C. 1, 14 ( 1868) 
(explaining that the legislature had the power to dispense with any particular 
formality, as it did to prescribe such regarding marriage once consent between 
the parties existed). The court went on to say: 
Id. 
This neither made nor impaired the contract, but gave effect to the 
parties' consent, and recognized as a legal relation that which the 
parties had constituted a natural one. So that, by force of the original 
consent of the parties while they were slaves, renewed after they 
became free, and by the performance of what was required by the 
statute, they became to all intents and purposes man and wife. This 
would be so upon the strictest construction; much more than upon the 
liberal construction which should be given to . . .  a domestic relation of 
one-third of our people, and the morals of society in general. (emphasis 
in original) 
169. Act of March 10, 1866, Ch. 40, § 5 (concerning negroes and persons of 
color or mixed blood). The Act states in part: 
And all persons whose cohabitation is hereby ratified into a state of 
marriage, shall go before the clerk of the cour
_
t of pleas and quarter 
sessions of the county in which they reside, at his office, or before some 
justice of the peace, and acknowledge the fact of such cohabitation, and 
the time of its commencement. 
Id. 
170. Act of March 10, 1866, Ch. 40, section 6 (concerning negroes and 
persons of color or of mixed blood). The act requires: 
That if any such persons shall fail to go before t�e cler� of the cou?ty 
court, or some justice of the peace of the county m which they reside, 
and have their marriage recorded before the first of Septem�er, one 
thousand eight hundred and sixty-six, they shall be deemed guilty of .a misdemeanor, and punished at the discretion of the court, and their 
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reside together in a marital relationship, North Carolina cour_
ts 
held that such continued habitation evidenced consent to marry. " '
 
The state of Florida also expressly rejected the dormancy 
model that viewed emancipation as the triggering event for the 
legalization of slave marriages, and instead relied on the 
legislature to legalize marriages between former . 
slaves. 
"Emancipation was not retroactive . . . nor render valid slave 
marriages contracted before, but not confirmed after, 
emancipation."172 In Adams u. Sneed, the Supreme Court of Florida 
noted that " [i]t is the province of the legislature to validate void or 
"d bl 
. "173 vo1 a e marriages . . . .  
Following emancipation, the state of Florida took an unusual 
approach to addressing the issue of legalization of slave 
relationships. The Act of January 1 1, 1866 required black couples 
living together as putative husband and wife to marry before 
"some person legally authorized to perform the marriage 
ceremony, and be regularly joined in the holy bands of 
matrimony."174 This was the only compulsory marriage statute 
failure for each month thereafter, shall constitute a separate and 
distinct offense. 
Id. See also State v. Melton, 26 S.E. 933, 934-35 (N.C. 1897)  ( explaining how 
slave marriages were legalized by operation of law). The court stated: 
[P] ersons married in North Carolina while slaves, who continued to 
cohabit after the abolition of slavery, were ipso facto legally married 
(Act 1866, Chap. 40), and no acknowledgment before an officer was 
essential. 'The marriage was complete before the prescribed 
acknowledgment' made before the clerk, even if such acknowledgment 
were not made at all. 
Id. See State v. Whitford, 86 N.C.  636, 639 ( 1882) (illustrating that 
cohabitation as man and wife with knowledge of the existence of the act 
constituted evidence of consent to the marriage). The court noted:  
Id. 
The act makes the cohabitation and living together as man and wife, 
after emancipation, and continued up to the time of the ratification of 
the act, evidence of the consent; if so, surely the continuing cohabitation 
and living together in that relation, after ratification for several years, 
with a full knowledge of the existence of the act and its purpose, must be 
held to be plenary evidence of a consent to the marriage. 
171. See Whitford, 86 N.C. at 639 (1882) (illustrating that cohabitation as 
man and wife with knowledge of the existence of the act constituted evidence 
of consent to the marriage). The court noted: 
Id. 
The act makes the cohabitation and living together as man and wife, 
after emancipation, and continued up to the time of the ratification of 
the act, evidence of the consent; if s o ,  surely the continuing cohabitation 
and living together in that relation, after ratification for several years, 
with a full knowledge of the existence of the act and its purpose, must be 
held to be plenary evidence of a consent to the marriage. 
172. Adams v .  Sneed, 25 So. 893, 894 (Fla. 1899). 
173. Id. 
174. Act of January 11,  1866, 1865 Fla. Laws Ch. 1469, § 1 (establishing and 
enforcing the marriage relation between persons of color). 
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enacted by a Confederate state during the postbellum period. The 
statute required couples to solemnize their relationships within 
nine months after the passage of the Act, or be subject to 
prosecution for the misdemeanor offense of "fornication and 
adultery."175This statutory framework came under heavy criticism 
by Florida courts. The Supreme Court of Florida in Daniel v. Sams 
held that "[s]uch a statute enforced would have filled the jails of 
the country with persons subject to the charge of fornication and 
adultery from an innocent cohabitation as husband and wife."176 
Similarly, in Christopher v. Mungen, the Florida Supreme Court 
addressed the practical difficulties that arose from enforcement of 
the Act.177 The Court noted: 
It is apparent that this statute had proven ineffectual to do justice 
to the emancipated slaves with reference to their status during 
slavery and the period just subsequent to emancipation. This was 
doubtless due to the general lack of acquaintance with the law by 
the freedmen and their inability to successfully meet the new 
conditions suddenly thrust upon them. 178 
The Florida legislature quickly responded to the inadequacies 
of the 1866 Act by adopting the Act of December 14, 1866. The 
passage of this new Act brought Florida in line with many other 
states that adopted the legislative model for the legalization of 
slave marriages. The Act of December 14, 1866, legalized all 
purported slave marriages where the couples cohabited together 
and "before the world recognized each other as husband and 
wife."179 Notwithstanding the statute's broad language, the Daniel 
175. Id. See also AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE, 
LABOR, MARRIAGE AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 45 
0998) (discussing the ramifications of marriage between freed slaves). 
Professor Stanley anecdotally notes: 
Just a few months after the Emancipation Proclamation, one freedman 
attested that there were 'more married than ever I knew before.' Former 
slaves heralded the marriage contract as they did not the right to sell 
their labor. After the war multitudes rushed to marry, often in mass 
ceremonies. 'The marriage law gives general satisfaction among the 
Freedmen and their wives,' reported a Virginia agent of the Freedmen's 
Bureau in 1866. Neither the bureau nor the legal codes of most southern 
states legitimated slave marriages simply as an incident of 
emancipation; instead they required freed people to renew old vo�s or 
exchange new ones in proper wedding ceremonies or else to be p�mshed 
for fornication and adultery. As another Virginia agent explamed, 'I 
carefully read the law to them and take _
pains in �xpl,
aining it to
_
them. so 
that they may fully understand it and its penalti�s. �n c�mplymg with 
the law, husbands and wives transmuted the nonbmdmg ntes of slavery 
into the rights of freedom. 
Id. 
176. 
177. 
178. 
179. 
Daniel v. Sams, 1 7  Fla. 487, 496 (1880). 
Christopher v. Mungen, 55 So. 273, 280 (Fla. 1 9 1 1). 
hl � �- 866) Daniel, 17 Fla. at 494-95. (quoting the act of December 14, 1 · 
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decision restricted the application of the Act to only legalize 
marriages between freed slaves where "coh�bit�tion and 
recognition" occurred subsequent to the emanc1pat�on _
of the 
slave.1�he Florida legislature revisited this issue agam with the 
passage o f  the Act of 1899. This Act retroactively validated 
purported slave marriages existing prior to 186� where such 
couples cohabitated together as husband and wife and were 
recognized as such "by the world."181 The marriages of slave 
couples were legally recognized even in the absence of 
participation in solemnization ceremonies. 182 This gap-filling 
provision ensured comprehensive recognition of slave relationships 
under Florida law. As a result, both antebellum and postbellum 
slave marriages received the legal recognition that they were 
entitled to. 183 
The states of Arkansas, Mississippi, and Georgia all adopted 
similar legislative models to legalize the marriages of former 
slaves. Notwithstanding its tumultuous civil rights history,"' 
Arkansas was one of a few Confe derate states that legalized slave 
marriage in a quick and efficient manner following the end of the 
Civil War. "An Act to legalize marriages of persons of color" was 
approved by the legislature on December 20, 1866, 
and took effect immediately thereafter.185 The Act l egalized all 
putative marriages between "persons of color," whether previously 
freed or slave, who were "living together as husband and wife" at 
the passage of the Act. 186 Two months later, the Arkansas 
legislature passed broad legislation restoring a number of civil 
rights to former slaves. Additionally, in order to legitimize 
180. Id. at 497. "A consistent and harmonious operation of the acts of 
December 14, 1866 . . .  restricts the operation of the act of December 14, 1866, 
to a living together as husband and wife since emancipation." Id. 
181. See Johnson v. Wilson 37 So. 179 (Fla. 1904) (construing the operation 
of the Act of 1899). 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. See generally JAMES C .  DURAM, A MODERATE AMONG EXTREMISTS: 
DWIGHT D .  EISENHOWER AND THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CRISIS 143-172 
(Nelson-Hall Publishers 1981) (noting that Little Rock, Arkans;s gained 
notoriety i n  1957 when nine African American students attempted to integrate 
the previously all white Central High School). Under orders of Governor Orval 
Faubus, the Arkansas National Guard was activated to prevent the students 
from entering the School. Id. at 169- 170. After intervention from the federal 
government, including personal intervention by President Dwight Eisenhower, 
the students were eventually enrolled in the School. Id. at 170. However, in 
1958 Governor Faubus closed the high schools for one year in an effort to 
prevent desegregation. Id. The schools reopened in 1959, and were forced to 
enroll African American students. Id. at 170. 
185. Act of Dec. 20, 1866, Ch. 13 Act of Ark. (legalizing marriages between 
people of color). The Act further provided that all children of said 
relationships were hereby declared "legitimate." Id. 
186. Id. 
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children born of slave relationships "not actually subsisting as 
marriages on December 20, 1866,"187 the legislature passed "An Act 
to declare the rights of persons of African descent."188 Section 3 of 
the 1867 Act was more broadly drafted, and as a result legalized 
relationships of all "negroes and mulattoes" who were "cohabiting 
as husband and wife" notwithstanding whether a putative 
marriage ceremony had been performed. 189 The clarity of this 
legislation produced few, if any, disputes regarding the validity of 
slave marriages. 190The states of Mississippi and Georgia191 utilized 
similar legislative frameworks to legalize the marriages of former 
slaves. 192 Following emancipation, slave couples were not 
recognized as legally married until Mississippi passed the Act of 
1865, conferring marital status on "freedmen, free negroes and 
mulattoes, who do now and have heretofore lived and cohabited 
together as husband and wife . . . . "193 This Act was prospective in 
187. Daniels v. Johnson, 226 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Ark. 1950). 
188. Act of Feb. 6, 1867, Ch. 35 (declaring the "rights of persons of African 
descent"). 
189. Id. The Act declares "[t]hat all negroes and mulattoes who are now 
cohabiting as husband and wife, and recognizing each other as such, shall be 
deemed lawfully married from the passage of the act, and shall be subject to 
all the obligations, and entitled to all the rights appertaining to the marriage 
relation . . . .  " Id. 
190. See generally Black v. Youmans, 179 S.W. 335 ( 1915) (holding that the 
act of Feb. 1867 controls having never been repealed); Gregley v. Jackson, 38 
Ark. 487, 490-94 (Ark. 1882) (addressing problems of inheritance caused by 
slave marriages); Scoggins v. State, 32 Ark. 205 (1877) (using defendants 
previous marriage under the Act of Feb. 6, 1867, as evidence of bigamy; 
however, the guilty verdict was reversed on procedural grounds). 
191. See William v. State, 33 Ga. 85, 93 ( 1 864) (reversing a murder 
conviction against the defendant based on his slave wife testifying against 
him). During the antebellum period, the state of Georgia recognized slave 
marriage in a limited context. Citing the long-held proposition that the 
testimony of a spouse is inadmissible, the Court in William recognized the 
validity of the slave marriage for the limited purpose of extending the rule of 
evidence to the facts of that case. Id. William, a male slave, was accused of 
killing another slave. Id. His purported wife, also a slave, testified that she 
saw her husband with an axe, the alleged murder weapon, on the evening of 
the murder. Id. at 89. This decision recognized that purported slave marriages 
afforded limited protections to the slave couple. Id. at 93. The Wil�iam. 
decisio.n 
held that the "contubernal relation among slaves shall be recogmzed m public 
sales whenever possible, and in criminal trials where it becomes important to 
the advancement of justice." Id. . 
" 
. 
192. See Andrews v. Simmons, 10 So. 65 (Miss. 1891) ( There bemg no 
marriages recognized in law among slaves, when th�s class of our population 
was enfranchised and elevated to citizenship, the legislat�re pro�ptl.y enacted 
laws applicable to the changed con�ition, so far a� poss��le vahdatmg slave­
marriages, and legitimating the fruits of �uch �arriages. ), Rundle v. Pegram, 
49 Miss. 751, ( 1874) (holding that there did exist among the colored peopl� �he 
marital relation and where these relations existed by th� mutua
l recognition 
of the parties, the constitution established it as lega� relati.o�s).
 . . . 
193. Act of Nov. 25,  1865, Ch. 4, §3, Act of Miss. (givmg civil nghts to 
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nature, and only legalized relationships existing at the passage of 
the Act. 194 Any relationship terminated by the death of one of the 
putative spouses prior to the passage of the Act was not 
retroactively legalized by this legislation. 195 
In 1866, Georgia's legislature passed the act of March 9, �8?6, 
which legalized the relationships of �
,
lacks who were �1v1,�� 
together at the time the Act was passed as husband and wife. 
In commenting on the purpose of the Act, the Supreme Court of 
Georgia in Williams v. State, ruled that the end of slavery 
freedmen). This Act also legitimized the children born of such relationships. 
Id. 
194. Reed v. Moseley, 23 So. 451,  452-53 (Miss. 1898) The court in Reed 
stated: 
Id. 
For neither the act of 1865, nor said section 22 of article 12 of the 
constitution of 1869, had the purpose or the effect to marry parties 
against their will. But where a legal impediment did exist to marriage, 
and the parties therefore could not elect legally to marry, but did, as a 
fact, attempt marriage, according to the then custom of the country, and 
did live together and cohabit as husband and wife for years, u p  to, at the 
time of, and after the adoption of, the act of 1865 and the constitution of 
1869, 'subsequent continued cohabitation' is 'of itself a strong 
circumstance to show an acceptance of the provisions of the act and the 
constitution, and a desire to assume towards each other a new and 
lawful relationship.' 
195. Andrews v. Simmons, 10 So. 65,  65 (Miss. 1891). In 1869, the language 
of the Act of 1865 was adopted as article XII, section 22, of the Mississippi 
Constitution's Bill of Rights. Id . The relevant provision states: 
[A] ll persons who have not been married, but are now living together, 
cohabiting as husband and wife, shall be taken and held, for all 
purposes in law, as married, and their children, whether born before or 
after the ratification of this constitution, shall be legitimate; and the 
legislature may, by law, punish adultery and concubinage. 
Id. 
Whereas the language of the 1865 Act specifically referred to "freedman, 
free negroes and mulattoes," the Section 22 of the Bill of Rights had broader 
application. Id. In Rundle v. Pegram, 49 Miss. 751, 755 ( 1874), the Supreme 
Court of Mississippi noted that although the language of the provision applied 
to "'all persons,' without regard to race, color or previous condition . . .  ," the 
primary purpose of this legislation was for the "benefit of the colored race." Id. 
Se�ti?n 2 2  did not confer legal status on all putative slave relationships 
ex1stmg at the passage of the account. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court held 
that only i1:1 � relationship where the co-habiting couple "accepting each other 
and recogmzmg each other as husband and wife, they shall be i n  law esteemed 
as . ma�ried . . .  .''. I�. at 756. �?twithstanding the passage of the 1865 legislation, constitutional recogmt10n of slave marriage was necessary due to questions concerning the validity of the 1865 Act. Id. at 755. "Because there may have been ��ubt wheth�r the legislature of 1865 may, o n  account of the 
:momalo�s cond1t10n of pubhc affairs,  in the estimation of some have been moperative and of no effect." Id. ' 
196. Act of Mar. 9, 1866, Title XXXI No 252 240 ( ·b· and 1 t. h 1 · ' · , . proscn ing regu a mg t e re ation of husband and wife between persons of color. 
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represented the demise of slaves living "in concubinage," and as 
such, they were entitled to have their relationships recognized as a 
"contract of marriage in the eye of the law."197 However, unlike 
Arkansas and Mississippi, Georgia retroactively ratified slave 
marriages "as if they had been always free and had been legally 
married."198 
During antebellum and postbellum periods, African­
Americans migrated to the District of Columbia seeking refuge 
from the slave-holding j uri sdictions located in the South.199 The 
course of action taken by the federal government to legalize the 
relationships of former slaves closely parallels the legislative 
models adopted by many Confederate states. Prior to 
Emancipation, the District of Columbia recognized the dual nature 
of slaves as persons and property. In this regard, slave couples 
were permitted to cohabitate as 'husband and wife' in unions 
grounded in moral, but not legal foundations.200 Compelled by 
"justice, humanity, as well as sound social policy," the United 
States Congress, following Emancipation, passed legislation to 
legalize slave marriages.201 The Act of 1866 provided that couples 
who were formerly slaves and continued to cohabitate at the 
passage of the Act, regardless of whether the marriage was 
solemnized, "shall be deemed husband and wife."202 Congressional 
197. Williams v. State, 67 Ga. 260, 262 (Ga. 1881 ) .  
198. See id. (asserting that in Georgia, the Act of 1866 recognized slaves 
living together as man and wife and pronounced them married in the eyes of 
the law). 
199. See Jennings v. Webb, 8 App. D.C. 43, 54 ( 1896) (noting the newly freed 
slaves demanded legal marriage rights and "[t]he spirit of this demand met 
with early and ready response in the legislation, of the former slave holding 
States, and in that of Congress, for the District of Columbia, in which great 
numbers of former slaves had congregated during and after the Civil War"). 
200. Id. at 43 . The court in Jennings stated: 
That the legal relation of husband and wife could not exist among 
slaves, was not an arbitrary rule, prompted by a spirit of cruelty and 
oppression, but a necessary condition of the institution of slavery whilst 
it existed. Slaves could make no contracts,  own no property; they were 
themselves property. The recognition of the duties, obligations and 
rights of the legal relation of husband and wife was necessarily 
incompatible with those conditions; hence they could not exist, and the 
illegitimacy of slave offspring followed as a logical result. 
Id. at 53. 
201. Id. (noting the rights slaves demanded after emancipation). The court 
further noted: 
When slavery had been abolished, and the right to acquire and transmit 
property had attached to the former slaves, justice and humanity, as 
well as sound public policy, demanded legislation giving legal sanction, 
as far as possible, to the moral obligations of these permissive relations, 
and rendering legitimate the offspring thereof. 
Id. 
202. Act of July 25, 1866, Ch. 2 (14 Stat. 536). Congress passed an almost 
identical Act in 1901 .  Act of Mar. 3, 1901, Ch. 854 (31 Stat. 1393). 
338 The John Marshall Law Review (39:299 
legalization of slave marriages came on the heels of the passage of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which at least facially conferred civil 
rights, including the right to marry, upon former slaves.200 These 
rights included the right "to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be 
parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, 
and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens."204 As a result thereof, 
civil rights were fully restored to former slaves residing in 
Washington, D.C. 
Reliance on state legislatures to confer civil rights on freed 
slaves was but one of many components in the emancipation 
process that led to the eventual removal of many legal and judicial 
barriers that had prevented blacks from having any hope of 
participating in postbellum America. This process was, however, a 
slow and painful one marked by legislative and j udicial decisions 
that nullified constitutional guarantees of due process and equal 
protection, and relegated freed blacks to second-class status.205 
Notwithstanding the vigorous enforcement of Jim Crow laws 
enacted during the Reconstruction era to prevent freed slaves from 
fully exercising their newfound civil rights,  the right of freed 
slaves to marry remained undisturbed by any legislative or 
judicial acts. 206 
203. Civil Rights Act of Apr. 9, 1866, Ch. 31 (14 Stat.) 27-29 204. Civil Rights Act of Apr. 9, 1866, Ch. 31 (14 Stat ) 27-29
. 
205. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,  544 (18
9
6). This United States Supreme
. 
?oui: d�cision was indicative of America's refusal to afford blacks full participation m the social, judicial and political c b · f · t ld I Pl th 
· fi · . . 
' �a nc o socie y. . n essy, e m enor po�ition of blacks was firmly established by the Court's a�nou�cement of the separate but equal" doctrine. Id t 552 CH l J dissentmg). The court stated: · a ar an ., 
The o.bject of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law b t 
· th · · ld t h b . , u , m e nature of things it cou no ave een mtended to abolish dist· t' b d to enforce social as d' t' . h d 
me wns ase upon color, or ' is mguis e from l't ' l l '  commingling of the two races u o 
P? i ica equ9: ity, or a 
permitting, and even requirin: 
� �rms unsa.tisf�ctory to either. Laws 
are liable to be brought i· t 
' e
t
ir separation m places where they . . n o  con act do not ·1 . 1 h mfenority of either race to th th 
necessan y imp y t e 
universally recogm'zed as 
e .othi
er, 
a
h
nd have been generally, if not 
· 
' . wi n t e compet f legislatures m the exercise of th 
. 1 . 
ency o the state 
Id. at 544. eir po ice power. 
206. While it is important to note that th . secured after emancipation th . h 
e nght to marry other blacks was 
· ' e ng t of blacks t 
· · 'al ma:i:-ag� was .not conferred until the 1967 . 
0 engage m mterrac1 
decision m Loving u. Virginia 388 U S 1 
Umted States Supreme Court ' . . ' 1 2  (1967). 
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V. STRUCTURAL COMPARISON OF SLAVE MARRIAGE LEGALIZATION 
MODELS 
The legislative and judicial constructs discussed in Part IV of 
this Article which led to the legalization of slave marriage were 
based upon the premise that slaves, even in a state of bondage, 
had a limited right to marry, or at the very least, were entitled to 
establish familial bonds. At the center of legal recognition, 
dormancy, and repudiation models that legalized slave marriages, 
was the idea that upon removal of their contractual incapacity, 
slaves were entitled to reclaim their right to marry. A factor that 
distinguishes the controversy surrounding same-sex marriages 
from the development of marital rights for African-Americans is 
the fact that the United States Supreme Court and Congress both 
acknowledged the fundamental right of freed slaves to marry. This 
right originated, not with the Emancipation Proclamation, the 
Thirteenth Amendment, or the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but with 
Lockean principles of natural or inalienable rights.201 The framers 
of The Declaration of Independence relied on John Locke's 
philosophies when referring to the inalienable rights of man to life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness .208 As early as 1865, 
supporters of the Thirteenth Amendment, m otivated by the same 
Lockean ideals, pushed for the restoration of the natural rights 
stripped from African-Americans during slavery.209 
207. G. SIDNEY BUCHANAN, THE QUEST FOR FREEDOM: A LEGAL HISTORY OF 
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 8 ( 1976). The author argues: 
Id. 
Conversely, to those supporting the amendment, the emancipation 
proclamations of President Lincoln and of the various states were not 
enough, as the incidents of slavery were not yet obliterated. The 
proponents of the amendment wanted to protect the civil liberties of all 
persons, whites as well as emancipated blacks. Here, the pro­
amendment faction was basing its arguments on the Lockean 
presupposition of natural rights and the protective function of 
government. Senators Sumner, Trumbull, and other amendment 
supporters believed that slavery had destroyed the natural rights that 
the Constitution was designed to protect and that abolition of slavery 
would, in turn, secure protection of natural rights for all persons 
regardless of race. 
208. See generally .ALLEN JAYNE, JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE: ORIGINS, PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY (1998) (discussing the 
theories arising out of the Declaration of Independence). 
209. See Edwin Vieira, Jr., Of Syndicalism, Slavery and the Thirteenth 
Amendment: The Unconstitutionality of "Exclusive Representation" in Public­
Sector Employment, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 515, 669 (1976) The author 
asserts that: 
What we should recall here is that the secular 'natural rights' theory 
best exemplified in John Locke's Second Treatise of Government was the 
intellectual source of the inalienable-rights philosophy which the 
Founders expressed in the Declaration and the Constitution. And this 
source also exercised an especially great influence on the course of 
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The first component of the restoration of civil rights to slaves 
was achieved through the elimination of their status as chattel by 
the execution of the Emancipation Proclamation and the passage 
of the Thirteenth Amendment.210 The second component of this 
process was the restoration t o  freed slaves of their inalienable 
rights .211 In The Civil Rights Cases, Justice Bradley noted that the 
Thirteenth Amendment "clothes Congress with power to pass all 
laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents 
f 1 »212 o s avery . . . .  
Congress fulfilled this grant of authority by restoring natural 
rights to freed slaves with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866.213 The Act provided that: 
such citizens, of every race and color , without regard to any previous 
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, . . . shall have the 
same right . . .  to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and 
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real 
and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all 
laws . . . . 214 
Justice Bradley viewed the denial of these natural rights as 
incidents of slavery that C ongress, with the passage of the 
events during the 1�60'�· Indeed, ' [t)hroughout the [post-Civil-War] d�bates, · · · two ma1or ideas were combined and recombined into a smgle ar�ment or purpose: First the Lockean presuppositions about natura� righ�s and the �rotective functions of government; secondly, 
Id. 
slavery s demal of these rights and this protection.' 
210. G. SIDNEY BUCHANAN, THE QUEST FOR FREEDOM: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 20 ( 1 976) The th s . · au or argues· ever
d
al conclusions concerning the intended reach of .the thirteenth amen ment can be drawn fr th E . . . om e debaters surrounding the manc1pat10n Proclamation, the adoption of th . the passage of the Fre d , B . e amendment itself, and 
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Id. ie is I erty. 
211. The Civil Rights Cases 109 U characterized this component 
'
of the 
.S . . 3, 20 ( 1 883).  Justice Bradley character" of the Amendment " t b . . 
Thirteenth Amendment as "reflex rt· al fr d es a hsh1ng d d · po 1 ic ee om throughout th U . an ecreemg universal civil and 212. Id. e n1ted States." Id. 
213. Act of April 9 1866 1 214. Act of April g 1866 i�tat. 27 ( 1 866). �m
d
·
�d _
States in their �ivil �;g�t 2 7  ( ld866). (protecting all persons in the vm 1cat10n). s, an furnishi'ng th f th · e means o err 
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"[T)hirteenth Amendment . . .  undertook to wipe out."215 He further 
noted that these rights were "fundamental rights which appertain 
to the essence of citizenship, and the enj oyment or deprivation of 
which constitutes the essential distinction between freedom and 
slavery."216 Although the slave marriage legalization models 
examined in Part IV of this Article created the framework for 
implementation of the slaves' right to marry, slaves were endowed 
with this fundamental right to contract marriage by the 
constitutional framers. Slave marriage legalization models as well 
as Supreme Court jurisprudence do not, however, reveal an 
historic antecedent that can serve as a framework for the 
argument that parallels exist between the slave marriage 
legalization paradigm that implicitly recognized the right of freed 
slaves to marry as a fundamental right, and the argument that 
same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry.211 In the 
absence of judicial or legislative recognition that same-sex couples 
have a fundamental right to marry, no legitimate parallels can be 
drawn between the legal recognition, dormancy, or repudiation 
models used to legalize slave marriages and the efforts to legalize 
same sex marriages .  
The legislative model discussed i n  Part IV is the only slave 
marriage legalization model that has any modern parallel with 
efforts to legalize same-sex marriage. The states of Arkansas, 
Florida, North Carolina, and Georgia u sed this model to confer 
civil rights upon freed slaves, including the right to marry, and 
thereby legalized existing slave relationships. Once conferred, 
these basic human rights remained undisturbed by any legislative 
or judicial acts. This was not the case with other Reconstruction 
era grants of civil rights, the actualization of which came about 
after hard fought battles such as the fight to desegregate public 
schools,218 to achieve the right to vote,219 and to integrate places of 
215. The Ciuil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22 ( 1883). 
216. Id. See also BUCHANAN supra note 210,  at 74-75 (arguing that "Un��r 
the Bradley analysis, Congress clearly had the power to de�n� a�d prohib�t 
badges and incidents of slavery, but there was an import�t hm!tat10n on thi� 
power."). Id. Congress could legislate only for the protectrnn ?f fu1:1damental 
rights, such as the right to contract, to hold property, and to give evi.dence. Id
. 
217. In 2003, in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.  558 (�003), the Umt�d S�ates 
Supreme Court held that gays and lesbians have the right to engage m P1:1vate 
sexual conduct free of governmental intrusion. Id. at 578. Such ,,rights, 
although founded in the "right to liberty under the Due Process Clause ,  of �he 
Fourteenth Amendment, did not address "whether the government must giv� 
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to en
ter. 
1�is s ll Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 ( 1954) . e� genera y, . "se arate but equal"); Brown v. Board of (overturnmg the doctrine of P . f B InCremanding the case to Ed . 349 U S  294 ( 1955) [herema ter rown . ucat10n, · · t' n to admit parties to public lower courts to take the necessary and proper ac 10 
schools on a nondiscriminatory basis). 
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public accommodat10ns. 
By utilizing state legislatures to effect change and to . 
con
_
fer 
rights, a legitimate parallel can b e  dra_wn between th� legahzat10n 
of slave marriages and the campaign to recognize same-sex 
marriage s .  Legislative efforts to legalize same-sex unions are in 
their infancy.221 The state of Vermont was the first .
�erican 
jurisdiction to pass legislation addressing this issue. --- � Act 
Relating to Civil Unions223 was p assed by the Vermont legislature 
in 2000 in response to the 1999 decision in Baker v. State.
""• In 
Baker, the Supreme Court of Vermont directed the Vermont 
legislature to create a statutory framework that would provide 
same-sex couples with "the common benefit, protection, and 
security that Vermont law provides opposite-sex married 
1 ,,225 coup es. 
The court's decision was grounded in the notion that the 
Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution requires 
extension of "the benefits incident to a Civil Marriage license 
under Vermont law" to same-sex couples.226 The Vermont Supreme 
Court retained j urisdiction over the case pending creation of a 
suitable legislative remedy.227 A number of options were available 
219. See generally the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C .A. § 1973 ( 1965) 
(prohibiting voting prerequisites or qualifications based on race). 
220. See generally the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-2000a-
3(b) (1965) (prohibiting discrimination or segregation in places of public 
accommodation). 
221. Legislative efforts to prevent same sex marriage, are however, in full 
force. See generally, 1996 Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 Pub.L. 104-
109 § 2(a), 1 1 0  Stat. 2419 (1996) (allowing states to choose not to legally 
recognize marriages performed in other states). Thirty eight states have 
passed legislation or constitutional amendments banning same sex marriage, 
including Hawaii, Alaska, Texas, Florida, Michigan, Arkansas, Oregon, and 
Pennsylvania. There are also a number of legislative efforts, on both the state 
and federal levels, to regulate same- sex marriage. For example, on July 14, 
2004, the United States Senate defeated the Federal Marriage Amendment, 
the language of which defined marriage as the union of a man and a woman. 
Philip Stephens, Clinton Urges Kerry to Avoid 'Cultural Issues, ' FIN. TIMES, 
July 15, 2004, at 1. The legislatures of a number of states including Arkansas 
and Ohio are considering whether to ban same-sex marriages. Celeste Katz, 
Pulling Lever on Hot Button Law Questions, DAILY NEWS, Oct. 3 1 ,  2004, at 27. 
222. An Act Relating to Civil Unions,  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 
(2005). 
223. An Act Relating to Civil Unions, VT . STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 
(2005). 
224. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1 999). 
225. Id. at 886. 
226. Id. The Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution, provides 
" [t)hat government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, 
protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the 
particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of 
persons, who are a part only of that community . . . . " VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7 .  
227. Baker, 744 A.2d at 864. 
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to the legislature, including granting same-sex couples the right to 
obtain a marriage license upon the same terms and conditions 
afforded to opposite sex couples.228 The court clearly established 
that the state "could do so," but that "it is not required" to grant 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples to comply with the Vermont 
Constitution's common benefits clause.229 
Although the holding in Baker and the passage of the Civil 
Unions Act affords same-sex couples with rights analogous to 
those held by opposite-sex couples, this framework fell far short of 
the explicit recognition of the right to marry granted to freed 
slaves in the postbellum South.23° Further, the Baker decision only 
focused on the discriminatory nature of Vermont's marriage 
statutes without considering the broader issue of whether same­
sex couples have a fundamental right to marry.231 
In 2005, Connecticut became the second state to follow 
Vermont's lead by passing legislation legalizing civil unions.232 
Unlike Vermont, civil unions were legalized by the Connecticut 
legislature withou t  prior judicial mandate. This legislation 
provides same-sex couples with "all the same benefits, protections 
and responsibilities under law . . .  as are granted to spouses in a 
marriage."233 However, this Act specifically distinguishes a civil 
union from a traditional marriage by defining marriage as "the 
union of one man and one woman," thus preserving the right to 
marry only for heterosexual couples.234 
228. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND 
THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 57-82 (2002) (discussing the process that led to 
the passage of civil union legislation in Vermont). 
229. Baker, 744 A.2d at 887.  
230. When faced with an almost identical issue, the Circuit Court of Oregon 
in Li v. State, decided against following the holding in Goodridge, and adopted 
the model utilized by Baker and the Vermont legislature. Li v. State, No . 0403-
03057, 2004 WL 1258 1 6 7  (Or. Cir. Apr. 20, 2004), rev'd en bane, 110 P.3d 9 1  
(Or. Apr. 14, 2005). The Circuit Court of Orgeon in Li noted that t�e 
legislature was the best forum for crafting a solution to this issue because "1t 
is the only realistic way to get the public at large squarely into th� process." 
Id. at *8. In deferring this matter to the legislature, the Court cautioned that 
the State must adopt a legislative model that will insure that s�me sex co��les 
are provided access to the "substantive rights afforded to married cou�les: Id. 
In 2004, Oregon voters approved Measure 36, imposing a state constitut10nal 
ban on same sex marriage. S .  1073, 73rd Or. Leg. Assem., 2005 Reg. Sess. (Or. 
2005). Notwithstanding the constitutional ban, in 2005, the Oregon Senate 
passed a bill allowing civil unions for same sex couples. Id. However, the 
measure was met with opposition from members of the Oregon House of 
Representatives, and has not been voted upon. 
231. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
232. An Act Concerning Civil Unions, 2005 Conn. P.A. 05-10 (S.S.B. 963) 
(Effective October 1, 2005). 
233. Id. at § 14. 
234. Id. 
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Reliance upon state legislatures to confer marital rights and define the 
scope of such rights has historic precedent dating back to the Supreme 
Court's first discussion of the importance of marriage within our 
society.235 In Maynard v. Hill, the C ourt acknowledged the essential role 
of the legislature in this regard when it stated: Marriage, as  creating the 
most important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals 
and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been 
subject to the control of the legislature. That body prescribes the age at 
which parties may contract to marry, the procedure or form essential to 
constitute marriage, the duties and obligations it creates,  its effects 
upon the property rights of both, present and prospective, and the acts 
which may constitute grounds for its dissolution.236 
The Supreme Court has often pleaded for j u dicial restraint 
when considering whether to expand substantive due process 
protections into areas like same-sex marriage, that are 
traditionally recognized as "deeply rooted in this Nation's history 
and tradition."237 In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court cautioned 
against the creation of jurisprudence that reflects the "policy 
preferences of the Members o f  this Court."238 It was for the purpose 
of restraining "an un-elected j udiciary from usurping the power of 
the legislature," that the Supreme Court articulated a body of 
jurisprudence governing the area of substantive due process law.239 
On an almost daily basis, state legislatures and judiciaries 
across the country are grappling with not only "expand[ing] the 
established right to marry," but also redefining "the legal meaning 
of 'marriage."'240 Not only is this decision o f  tremendous 
importance to the country, but almost equally as crucial is 
235. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 ( 1888).  
236. Id. at 205. 
237. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 43 1 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) .  The Supreme 
Court stated: 
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this 
Court . . There are . risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection 
_
t
fi
o certa�n. 
substantive liberties without the guidance of the 
more speci ic prov1s10ns of the Bill of Rights. As the history of the 
�oc?ner era de
_
mo��tra�es, there is  reason for concern lest the only 
hmits to such Judi�ial mtervention become the predilections of those 
Id. 
who happen at the time to be Members of this Court. 
C
238·t 
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d
gton v. Glucksberg, 5 2 1  U.S.  702, 720 ( 1997) Here the Supreme 
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Id. (citations omitted). 
y pre erences of the Members of this Court. 
239. Lewis v. Harris, No. Mer-L- 15 0 
Ct. Law Div. Nov. 15, 2003).  
- 3 ,  2003 WL 23191 1 14, *8 (N.J. Super. 
240. Standhardt v Count f M  . . y o  ancopa, 77 P.3d 451, 458 (Ariz.  2003) . 
2006] The History of Slave Marriage in the United States 345 
whether the ultimate decision-maker will b e  the judiciary or the 
legislature. Even in decisions favorable to advocates of same-sex 
marriage, like Baker and Li v. State, the c ourts cautioned that 
they were not extending the right to marry to s ame-sex couples.241 
In Goodridge, the Massachusetts Supreme Court recognized this 
growing concern over judicial legislation, and tried to draw a 
distinction between its decision and judicial activism that the 
dissenting opinion accused the court of engaging in.242 In 
Goodridge, the court argued that notwithstanding its 
"reformulation" of the definition of civil m arriage, the decision 
"leaves intact the Legislature's broad discretion to regulate 
marriage."243 This is a difficult position to defend when so many 
courts that considered whether same-sex couples have a right to 
marry, have turned to their respective state legislatures for 
guidance.244 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Recognition that parallels exist between efforts to legalize 
same-sex marriages and the legislative path taken by abolitionists 
to restore civil rights to freed slaves offers reciprocal benefits to 
African-Americans and same-sex marriage advocates. The most 
241. Baker, 744 A.2d at 887; Li, 2004 WL 1258167 at *7. 
242. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 983 (Mass. 
2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting). Justice Cordy stated: 
Because I find these conclusions to be unsupportable in light of the 
nature of the rights and regulations at issue, the presumption of 
constitutional validity and significant deference afforded to legislative 
enactments, and the 'undesirability of the judiciary substituting its 
notions of correct policy for that of a popularly elected Legislature' 
responsible for making such policy, I respectfully dissent. Although it 
may be desirable for many reasons to extend to same-sex couples the 
benefits and burdens of civil marriage (and the plaintiffs have made a 
powerfully reasoned case for that extension), that decision must be 
made by the Legislature, not the court. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
243. Id. at 969. 
244. See Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 459 (upholding marriage law which defined 
a valid marriage as solely between a man and a woman). In reaching its 
decision, the court explained, "[w]e are mindful of the Supreme Co�rt's 
admonition to 'exercise the utmost care' in conferring fundamental-nght 
status on a newly asserted interest lest we transform the libe�ty_ protected by 
due process into judicial policy preferences rather than principles born of 
public debate and legislative action." Id. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1 197 
(Wash. 1974). In Singer, the court stated: . . 
, 
We do not seek to define in detail the 'interests of basic importance 
which are served by retaining the present definit�on of marriage. as the 
legal union of one man and one woman. The societal values _which are 
involved in this area must be left to the examination of the legislature. 
Id. 
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obvious benefit is that it silences critics who argue that the same­
sex marriage advoca:es are ina�propriatel!' ca���alizi�g on �he 
civil rights gains achieved by Afncan-Amenc�ns. Puhtze_
r Pnze 
winning African-American newspaper colummst Leonard Pit��· �r. 
has often responded to African-American leaders who cr1tic1ze 
comparisons between the racial civil rights movement and the 
same-sex marriage movement. 246 Pitts notes that the same-sex 
marriage movement "isn't the civil rights movement, but make no 
mistake: it's definitely a civil rights movement."247 By fostering an 
atmosphere of mutual recognition, each group can draw upon and 
learn from the political strategies and experiences utilized by their 
respective counterparts to achieve social, political, and economic 
equality. 
Finding common ground between the same-s ex movement 
and the African-American civil rights movement will ultimately 
save African-Americans from themselves. "We have become what 
we despised." This often quoted phrase has particular applicability 
when examining the growing African-American criti cism of same­
sex marriage. For years, white segregationists generated hysteria 
over interracial marriage through the use of biblical references 
and predictions about the destruction of traditional American 
family values. 248 African-American opponents of same-sex marriage 
are unashamedly using the same racist arguments to deny 
equality to gay and lesbian couples.249 African-Americans have 
joined forces with conservative white political groups who, 
contemporaneous with their attacks on same-sex marriage, also 
support efforts to ban race-based affirmative action programs that 
benefit members of the constituencies that those s ame African-
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American leaders represent. This misdirected energy against the 
same-sex marriage movement is not only inconsistent with the 
tenets of the equality espoused by so many African-American civil 
rights leaders, but more importantly, it detracts the American 
society from addressing some of the real issues affecting African­
American families and communities like drug abuse, 
unemployment, absentee fathers, and increasing rates of HIV and 
AIDS.260 
Utilization of state legislatures to achieve civil rights 
protections for same-sex couples in fact strengthens the 
development of parallels between the racial and sexual minority 
groups. During the height of the Civil Rights Movement, Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. publicly lobbied President John F. 
Kennedy and members of Congress for passage of civil rights 
legislation, including the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
brought about sweeping changes to the racial climate of the 
United States.251 The legislative phase of the Civil Rights 
Movement achieved as much, if not more significant 
transformation toward a racially integrated society than any other 
political or judicial efforts, including boycotts, sit-ins and freedom 
rides. Although advocates of same-sex marriage achieved j udicial 
success in Massachusetts as a result of Goodridge,252 sweeping 
changes to the social, cultural, and p o litical landscape should not 
come about without input from the public and accountability for 
decision-making that m ay be contrary to its will. 
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